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ABSTRACT 
 
Oblivious Handshakes and Sharing of Secrets of Privacy-Preserving Matching and 
Authentication Protocols. (May 2011) 
Pu Duan, B.S., Xi’an Jiaotong University, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyh-Charn Liu 
The objective of this research is focused on two of the most important privacy-
preserving techniques: privacy-preserving element matching protocols and privacy-
preserving credential authentication protocols, where an element represents the 
information generated by users themselves and a credential represents a group 
membership assigned from an independent central authority (CA). The former is also 
known as private set intersection (PSI) protocol and the latter is also known as secret 
handshake (SH) protocol. In this dissertation, I present a general framework for design 
of efficient and secure PSI and SH protocols based on similar message exchange and 
computing procedures to confirm “commonality” of their exchanged information, while 
protecting the information from each other when the commonalty test fails. I propose to 
use the homomorphic randomization function (HRF) to meet the privacy-preserving 
requirements, i.e., a common element/credential can be computed efficiently based on 
homomorphism of the function, and an uncommon element/credential is difficult to 
derive because of the randomization of the same function. 
iv 
Based on the general framework, two new PSI protocols with linear computing 
and communication cost are proposed. The first protocol uses full homomorphic 
randomization function as the cryptographic basis, and the second one uses partial 
homomorphic randomization function. Both of them achieve element confidentiality and 
private set intersection. A new SH protocol is also designed based on the framework, 
which achieves unlinkability with a reusable pair of credential and pseudonym and the 
fewest number of bilinear mapping operations. I also propose to interlock the proposed 
PSI protocols and SH protocol to design new protocols with new security properties. 
When a PSI protocol is executed first and the matched elements are associated with the 
credentials in a following SH protocol, authenticity is guaranteed on matched elements. 
When a SH protocol is executed first and the verified credentials is used in a following 
PSI protocol, detection resistance and impersonation attack resistance are guaranteed on 
matching elements.  
The proposed PSI and SH protocols are implemented to provide privacy-
preserving inquiry matching service (PPIM) for social networking applications and 
privacy-preserving correlation service (PAC) of network security alerts. PPIM allows 
online social consumers to find partners with matched inquiries and verified group 
memberships, without exposing any information to unmatched parties. PAC allows 
independent network alert sources to find the common alerts without unveiling their 
local network information to each other. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy concerns have become one of the most important security issues in many 
Internet applications, e.g., privacy leaks in social networking services [1][2][3][4][5], 
malicious vulnerability exploitation through public networking alerts sharing services 
[6][7][8][9], and identity attacks on a genomic database [10][11], etc. The dilemma of 
enjoying more convenient networking services vs. risking the compromise of more 
private information raises a key problem for researchers: How to provide practical and 
secure Internet services while protecting consumer privacy? To solve this problem, 
numerous privacy-preserving applications have been proposed in the literature 
[6][10][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20]. Despite their different degrees of success, 
it is well recognized that most existing solutions face challenges of poor system 
scalability, high computing costs, and inadequate security protections [21][22][23].  
Most of the above applications rely heavily on various cryptographic techniques 
to fulfill the designated functionality while preserving user privacy. Two of the most 
important techniques are privacy-preserving element matching protocols and privacy-
preserving credential authentication protocols. They are designed to provide protection 
for user’s two main kind of information: element as information that are generated by 
users themselves and credential as information that are assigned from dependent central 
authority (CA). The former, also known as private set intersection (PSI) protocol [24], 
aims to compute the intersection of elements provided by two parties without exposing 
____________ 
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other information.  Elements not in the intersection are kept secret. The latter, also 
known as secret handshake (SH) protocol [25], aims to verify/authenticate credentials of 
two parties. In this dissertation a credential represents the membership of a group. A SH 
protocol requires that two parties can confirm matching of affiliations if they have the 
same credentials (group memberships); otherwise, the affiliation of one party cannot be 
derived from the other party. These two subjects are widely studied, because improving 
associated computing and communication costs will have profound implications on a 
broad range of privacy-preserving applications like privacy-preserving genomic 
computation [10][18], privacy-preserving network alert correlation [6][12][14], and 
private email service [26]. 
In this dissertation, a general framework was proposed for design of efficient and 
secure privacy-preserving element matching and credential authentication protocols. 
Based on a thorough analysis of a broad range of algorithms, we concluded that they 
follow similar message exchange and computing procedures, and use similar techniques 
to confirm “commonality” of their exchanged information, while protecting the 
information from each other when the commonalty test fails. A homomorphic 
randomization function (HRF) was proposed to meet the conflicting requirement, i.e., 
common element/credential can be computed efficiently based on homomorphism of the 
function and uncommon element/credential are difficult to derive based on the 
randomization of the same function.  A common ground of the two major fields was also 
introduced to streamline their system models and cryptographic bases, so that we can 
design more efficient algorithms for both types of applications. The holistic modeling of 
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different privacy preserving protocols on the same crypto bases greatly simplifies the 
design of new and more efficient privacy-preserving protocols. That said, either a PSI or 
a SH protocol can be designed in three common phases: Protocol Initialization phase, 
Secret Mapping phase and Result Computing Phase. For a PSI or SH protocol executed 
between Alice and Bob, in the first phase Alice’s secrets are processed by using the HRF 
to meet the security requirement. Then in the second phase Bob’s secrets are combined 
with the Alice’s randomized secrets by using the HRF, too. At last in the third phase the 
combined secrets are computed by Alice to find out the matched ones.  
Based on the proposed general framework and homomorphic randomization 
function two new private set intersection protocols with linear computational and 
communication complexity were proposed for element matching. In our design Alice 
(Bob) directly takes elements as secret numbers and associates them with chosen large 
random numbers such that elements cannot be derived. Since the random numbers are 
generated through a homomorphic function, Alice (Bob) can modify Bob’s (Alice’s) 
associated values for privacy-preserving matching. While the first PSI protocol is based 
on full homomorphic randomization function, the second protocol is based on partial 
homomorphic randomization function, which is more secure against active attacks like 
falsification. The proposed solutions improve existing PSI protocols by reducing time 
complexity from O(n2) (n is the number of elements) [24] or O(nL) (L is the average bit 
length of an element) [27] to O(n)  in honest-but-curious adversarial model. 
Based on the framework and homomorphic randomization function a new 
unlinkable secret handshake protocol with reusable credential was proposed for 
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credential authentication. In our design user’s assigned pseudonyms are randomized by 
the homomorphic randomization function to provide reusability of credentials. The 
random number minimizes the correlation among authentication messages even they are 
produced by reuse of the same credential. The proposed solution improves existing 
unlinkable SH protocols by reducing communication complexity from infinite one-time-
use credentials [25] to constant number of credentials and time complexity from 6 
bilinear mapping operations [28] to 2 bilinear mapping operations.  
The proposed protocols were also interlocked to provide authenticity on 
matching elements. In our first design a private set intersection protocol is executed first 
and matched elements are computed. Then a secret handshake protocol is executed for 
privacy-preserving authentication of both credentials and the matching elements. Our 
design associates the matching elements with group secret through the HRF and 
provides authenticity on the matching elements. In our second design a secret handshake 
protocol is executed first and assigned credentials are verified. Then a private set 
intersection is executed for privacy-preserving matching of both elements and the 
verified credentials. Our design utilizes the pairwise session key generated after a 
successful secret handshake and guarantees detection and impersonation attack 
resistance on the matching elements.  
The proposed protocols were implemented to provide privacy-preserving inquiry 
matching service for social networking applications (e.g., Facebook [29]) and privacy-
preserving correlation service of network security alerts. In the privacy-preserving social 
application we designed a privacy preserving inquiry matching (PPIM) system based on 
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an end-user privacy control model. Online social service consumers first use non-
privileged information to discover PPIM candidates on existing social networking 
services (SNS). The discovery results are then passed to a PPIM relay server by SNS, so 
that interested parties can engaged in PPIM transactions through exchange of encrypted 
inquiries between pairs. Using the proposed PSI protocol for matching of (encrypted) 
inquires, and the unlinkable secret handshaking protocol for membership verification, 
only the owner and her peer with a matched inquiry can know the real transaction 
content, but not any other users, including SNS providers. Experimental results show 
that the proposed scheme has scalable, reasonable computing costs, roughly 0.12-0.13 
per request consisting of 10 records for the encryption strength equivalent to 1024-bit 
RSA. In the privacy-preserving alert correlation application we designed a privacy-
preserving alert correlation (PAC) system to correlate network security alerts between 
semi-honest users, i.e., users who will correlate authentic alerts generated from their 
networks, but they may want to learn about others’ alerts using passive attacks. Two 
different protocols based on the homomorphism of the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) 
were implemented for PAC. The first protocol is the proposed partial homomorphism 
based PSI protocol, which is implemented for privacy-preserving matching of attributes 
of known formats in PAC, e.g., IP addresses, port numbers, etc. Expanding from the 
matching protocol, the second protocol is designed for privacy-preserving computation 
of the longest common sub-string (LCS) between two input strings. A major challenge is 
solved in the second protocol to protect locations of unmatched string elements while 
correctly identify the LCS. The LCS can be used for generating common contents of 
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captured malware/intrusion payloads. We implemented a set of working prototypes of 
PAC to demonstrate privacy-preserving detection of attack patterns (e.g., attack chain) 
and attack contents (e.g., common worm signature) using alerts generated from Snort 
[30], Autograph [31], and a trace collected from a real-world honeynet. The experiments 
show that crypto-based correlation of large number of highly privacy sensitive alert data 
can be done at reasonable costs, e.g., 2 minutes for matching of two sets of 10k records. 
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II. A GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF PSI AND SH PROTOCOLS 
In this section we propose a general framework to represent the interrelationship 
between privacy-preserving element matching protocols and privacy-preserving 
credential authentication protocols, where an element refers to a string generated by a 
user, and a credential refers to a ciphertext generated by an authority and issued to a user 
for subsequent off-line, mutual authentication of the membership of a group. The unified 
framework is used to illustrate the common structure for both the matching protocols 
and authentication protocols. We also analyze their relationship and illustrate how to 
utilize different mathematical functions to design different matching and authentication 
protocols under the same framework.   
A. INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS 
Private set interaction (PSI) protocols and secret handshaking (SH) protocols are 
two major families of privacy preserving matching protocols. In both protocols Bob and 
Alice exchange encoded messages to jointly compute certain type of commonality from 
the messages. For PSI, Bob and Alice can find out the intersection of their two sets of 
elements, without unveiling to each other the rest of unmatched elements. For SH, Bob 
and Alice can find out if they both belong to the same group using credentials that they 
received from central authorities (CA). Because of their different requirements in 
management of secrets (certain types of private data), these two types of protocols are 
usually studied independently. Direct management issues for secrets include generation, 
encryption-decryption, disclosure, and reuse of secrets. Moreover, indirect management 
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issues, especially inference of using certain secrets for different transactions, i.e., aka 
linkability of transactions, are also considered important for certain applications.  
In PSI a principal has total freedom in generation of new sets of elements for 
matching, yet in SH a principal must  submit his/her identity to the CA, so that the CA 
can generate random numbers as his/her pseudonyms, and associates the pseudonyms 
with a value that represents the secret of the requested group to produce her credential. 
Here the users can only use her credential to perform authentication function and cannot 
derive the group secret from the assigned credential. Since both credentials and group 
memberships represent the same kind of information used to prove a user’s affiliation, in 
the dissertation we will not differentiate between them. The objective of element 
matching between two parties is to find out the intersection of their input sets of 
elements (i.e., matched elements) without allowing one party to know the other party’s 
unmatched elements. The objective of credential authentication between two parties is to 
verify whether or not their credentials have identical group secret, which is only known 
owned by a central authority. The privacy preserving property requires that the 
affiliation of one party cannot be derived from the other party, if they do not have the 
same group secret; otherwise, if they do, they can confirm matching of affiliations. In 
addition, it is not feasible to tell whether two executions of the handshake protocol were 
performed by the same party or not, even if both of them were successful. 
Based on a high level analysis of a broad range of algorithms 
[24][25][26][27][28][32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39], one can conclude that they follow  
similar  message exchange and computing procedures. They also use similar techniques 
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to confirm “commonality” of their exchanged information, while protecting the 
information from each other when the commonalty test fails, as their common security 
requirements. The objective of this research is to explore the common ground of the two 
major fields to streamline their system models and cryptographic bases, so that we can 
design more efficient algorithms for both types of applications. More specifically, we 
propose to use homomorphic randomization function to meet the common conflicting 
requirement, i.e., common element/credential can be computed efficiently based on 
homomorphism of the function and uncommon element/credential are difficult to derive 
based on the randomization of the same function. As it will become clear later, holistic 
modeling of different privacy preserving protocols on the same crypto bases simplifies 
the design of new and more efficient privacy-preserving protocols. That said, either a 
PSI or a SH protocol can be designed in three common phases: Protocol Initialization 
phase, Secret Mapping phase and Result Computing Phase. 
B. NOTATIONS OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS 
Before going into the details of privacy-preserving protocols, we introduce the 
notation in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. In this research we assume that two parties Alice and 
Bob interact with each other to execute privacy-preserving element matching protocols 
and credential authentication protocols. In the follows we first present a definition list of 
all terms required in our privacy-preserving protocols.  
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Table 1 Definitions of general terms. 
Group Any number of parties considered as a unit with a common secret 
Group Secret A large number that represents the membership of a group 
Identity A party’s real name that is used to acquire credentials and pseudonyms 
Pseudonym An arbitrary string that represents the identity of a group member from CA 
Credential A large number that consists of a group secret and a pseudonym, which is used to 
prove genuineness of a group membership associated with the specific pseudonym 
Central Authority  The authority who assigns credentials and pseudonyms to parties 
Element An arbitrary string generated by a party that belongd to a given set 
Element Set A collection of elements classed together 
Intersection The set of elements that two element sets have in common 
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Table 2 Notations of general parameters. 
Central Authority (CA) An authority who assigns credentials and pseudonyms to parties 
Alice and Bob Two legitimate parties who execute the protocols 
Eve Passive adversary 
Mallory, Mallet, Trudy Active adversaries 
i, j, k, n, m, w Six positive integers that represent numbers of elements, group secrets, 
pseudonyms, etc 
τ Security parameter 
q A large prime number 
G1 An additive cyclic group of prime order q 
PB Base element (generator) of G1 
G2 A multiplicative cyclic group of prime order q 
H1 A collision-free hash function that maps a string to an element in G1 
H2 A collision-free hash function that maps a string with arbitrary length to 
a string with fixed length 
e A bilinear map 
sA, sB Alice’s and Bob’s secrets, respectively 
rA1, rA2, rA3 Alice’s chosen random numbers 
rB1, rB2, rA3 Bob’s chosen random numbers 
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Table 3 Notations of privacy-preserving credential authentication protocols. 
G = (g1, …, gw) CA’s set of group secrets 
gi, gj i-th and j-th secret in G 
gA, gB the group secret  of Alice’s and Bob’s single group membership 
IDA = (idA1, …, idAn), 
IDB = (idB1, …, idBm) 
Alice’s and Bob’s assigned pseudonym set, respectively 
idAi, idBj i-th and j-th assigned pseudonyms of IDA and IDB, respectively 
idA, idB Alice’s and Bob’s single pseudonym 
CREDA = (credA1, …, credAn), 
CREDB= (credB1, …, credBm), 
Alice’s and  Bob’s assigned credential sets, respectively 
credAi, credBj i-th and j-th credentials of CREDA and CREDB, respectively 
credA, credB Alice’s and Bob’s single credential , respectively 
credAi = f(idAi, gA), 
credBj = f(idBj, gB) 
f presents the function that associates a group secret with a pseudonym 
rIDA = (rdA1, …, rdAn), 
rIDB = (rdB1, …, rdBm) 
Alice’s  and Bob’s homomorphicly randomized pseudonym sets, 
respectively 
rdAi, rdBj i-th and j-th homomorphicly randomized pseudonyms in rIDA and rIDB 
rdA, rdB Alice’s and Bob’s single homomorphicly randomized pseudonym 
vA, vB Alice’s and Bob’s credential verification values, respectively 
vA(B), vB(A) Alice’s verification value computed by Bob and Bob’s verification 
value computed by Alice, respectively 
VAB Alice and Bob common value after a successful handshake 
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Table 4 Notations of privacy-preserving element matching protocols. 
X = (x1, …, xn) Alice’s input elements 
Y = (y1, …, ym) Bob’s input elements 
X∩Y = (xy1,…,xyw) Intersection of Alice’s and Bob’s input sets 
xi, yj i-th and j-th elements of X and Y, respectively 
kEA, kDA Alice matching keys for encryption and decryption, respectively 
kEB, kDB Bob matching keys for encryption and decryption, respectively 
E(X) = (cx1, …, cxn) 
E(Y) = (cy1, …, cym) 
Alice’s and Bob’s encrypted element sets, respectively 
cxi = cxi_f, cxi_b Front part and back part of Alice’s i-th encrypted element 
cyj = cyj_f, cyj_b Front part and back part of Alice’s j-th encrypted element 
M(E(X)) = (mx1, …, mxn) 
M(E(Y)) = (my1, …, mym) 
Alice’s modified encrypted element set and Bob’s modified encrypted 
element set, respectively 
mxi = mxi_f, mxi_b Front part and back part of Alice’s i-th modified encrypted element 
myj = myj_f, myj_b Front part and back part of Alice’s j-th modified encrypted element 
 
C. GENERAL DEFINITIONS AND ADVERSARY MODEL 
Fig. 1 presents a general illustration of the building elements of both PSI and SH 
protocols. Here, a central authority (CA) assigns a credential (e.g., VIP membership of a 
bank) separately to each of the parties, Alice and Bob.  After the registration process, the 
CA is no longer involved in interactions between Alice and Bob. Parties who have the 
same credential are considered in a same group. Privacy-preserving authentication of 
credentials between parties can be done by SH protocols. If an authentication succeeds 
(i.e., they are in a same group), both of them know this fact. Otherwise, no information 
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about each other’s identity and affiliation (who assigns the credential) can be unveiled. 
Alice and Bob also have their own elements, and they can perform privacy-preserving 
matching of their elements based on a PSI protocol, without any involvement of the CA. 
After the execution of a PSI protocol, Alice and Bob can only know the intersection of 
their element sets. Alice cannot determine Bob’s elements that are not in the intersection 
set, and vice versa. In the follows we first present the formal definition of PSI and SH 
protocols.  
Definition II.1 Private Set Intersection Protocol. Alice has her element set X= (x1, …, 
xn) and Bob has his element set Y = (y1, …, ym). After the execution of a PSI protocol, 
Alice (or Bob or both) knows X ∩ Y. Alice cannot know Y’, where ∀ yj ∈ Y’, yj ∈ Y and 
yj ∉ X. Bob cannot know X’, where ∀ xi ∈ X’, xi ∈ X and xi ∉ Y. A simple case of the 
protocol is as follows: suppose Alice has element x and Bob has element y, they want to 
find whether x = y. If yes, they know the fact. If not, Alice does not know y and Bob 
does not know x. More specifically, PSI protocols need to satisfy the following 
requirements: 
Requirements of PSI Protocols include (1) (x1, …, xn)and (y1, …, ym) should be 
exchanged in some “format”, (2) If xi = yj, Alice and Bob can find out the fact. 
Otherwise, nothing is disclosed, (3) Messages transmitted during the matching process 
do not reveal any sensitive information. 
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Fig. 1. A general framework of PSI and SH protocols. 
 
Definition II.2 Secret Handshake Protocol. Alice has a pair consisting of a pseudonym 
and a credential, idA and credA, assigned from a central authority. Bob has his idB and 
credB assigned from a central authority. After the execution of an SH protocol, Alice and 
Bob know that credA and credB indicate common same group membership (i.e., credA 
and credB contain a same group secret) if SH succeeds; otherwise, Alice (Bob) cannot 
know anything about credB(credA). In addition, if Alice has two executions of a SH 
protocol with Bob, he cannot know that he interacted with one same party. More 
specifically, SH protocols need to satisfy the following requirements: 
Requirements of SH Protocols include (1) idA (idB) should not be linked to Alice 
(Bob), (2) If Alice and Bob are in a same group, they can compute two identical 
verification values independently such that they know credA “=”credB, (3) If Alice and 
Bob are not in a same group, Alice (Bob) cannot derive any information (i.e., affiliation) 
from the verification value sent from Bob (Alice).   
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By looking through the formal definitions of both PSI and SH protocols, we 
point out that they share two requirements: (1) if and only if Alice and Bob have 
matching elements (credentials), the equality of the matching elements (credentials) 
must be computable by both principals. (2) Outsiders cannot infer any of the 
matching/authentication results. Bob cannot know unmatched elements/credentials of 
Alice, and vice versa. 
In Fig. 2 we present the general adversary and attack model for privacy-
preserving element matching and credential authentication protocol. In our model we 
assume that Alice (legitimate party) interacts with Bob (legitimate party) to execute both 
secret handshake protocols and private set intersection protocols. For simplicity we 
assume that both Alice and Bob belongs to one specific group, respectively. The SH 
protocols are for privacy-preserving authentication between Alice’s credential set 
CREDA = f(IDA, gA) = (credA1, …, credAn) = (f(idA1, gA),…, f(idAn, gA)) and Bob’s 
credential set CREDB = f(IDB, gB) = (credB1, …, credBm) = (f(idB1, gB),…, f(idBm, gB)). 
Here IDA = (idA1, …, idAn) (IDB = (idB1, …, idBm)) represents Alice’s (Bob’s) assigned 
pseudonym set, gA(gB) represents the secret of the single group Alice (Bob) belongs to 
and f represents the function that associates a group secret with a pseudonym. The PSI 
protocols are for privacy-preserving matching of Alice’s element set X = (x1, x2, …, xn) 
and Bob’s element set Y = (y1, y2, …, ym). 
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Fig. 2. General adversary and attack model for privacy-preserving protocols. 
 
In the model there are two kinds of adversaries: active adversaries Mallory, 
Mallet and Trudy and passive adversary Eve. Here for simplicity Trudy also launches 
passive attacks and Eve also launches active attacks.  
For secret handshake protocols there are three kinds of attacks: linkability 
detection, group membership detection and group membership impersonation. Among 
them linkability detection and group membership impersonation are active attacks since 
adversaries need to interact with parties to launch the attacks. Group membership 
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detection is a passive attack since adversaries can utilize eavesdropping or interception 
techniques to get the transmitted messages and then analyze the information to launch 
the attack.  In the follows we describe the detail of the attack scenarios.  
Definition II. 3 Linkability Detection. Mallory executes a SH protocol with Alice in 
SH execution_1 and Mallet also executes a SH protocol with Alice in SH execution_2. 
In SH execution_1 Alice sent her pseudonym idA1 to Mallory for computing the 
verification value and in SH execution_2 Alice sent her pseudonym idA2 to Mallet.  After 
the executions (successful or not) Mallory and Mallet collude and try to figure out 
whether idA1 and idA2 belong to a same party, i.e., Alice.  
Definition II. 4 Group Membership Impersonation. Trudy executes a SH protocol 
with Bob in SH execution_3 and try to make it successful. That said, Trudy tries to 
convince Bob that he is also a owner of the group secret gB, i.e., he owns a credential in 
credential set f(IDT, gB), where IDT is his own pseudonym set.  
Definition II. 5 Group Membership Detection. Trudy chooses a target group secret gB’ 
and tries to find out whether Bob’s group secret is gB’, i.e., whether gB = gB’. 
For private set intersection protocols there are two kinds of attacks: element 
detection and set intersection attack. Among them element detection is a passive attack 
since adversaries can utilize eavesdropping or interception techniques to get the 
transmitted messages and then analyze the information by launching dictionary attacks. 
Set intersection attack is an active attack since adversaries need to interact with parties to 
launch the attacks. In the follows we describe the detail of the attack scenarios. 
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Definition II. 6 Element Detection. Eve tries to find out the values of X and/or Y by 
launching any passive attack on Alice’s and Bob’s transmitted messages in their PSI 
execution.  
Definition II. 7 Set Intersection Attack. Eve executes a PSI protocol with Alice in PSI 
execution_1. She computed the intersection of their elements X ∩ Y’, where Y’ 
represents the set of her own elements. Eve tries to find out Alice’s elements that are not 
in X ∩ Y’. 
D. A GENERAL PRIVACY-PRESERVING FRAMEWORK 
To satisfy the requirements of PSI and SH protocols and defend against the 
attacks mentioned above, first Alice needs to initialize a matching/authentication process 
by sending her parameters to Bob. Here we assume that Alice is the sender who 
initializes the matching/authentication protocol and Bob is the receiver who responds to 
Alice’s request. The first phase is called Protocol Initialization. After Bob received the 
request, he needs to find a way to map his secrets (i.e., elements in PSI and credential in 
SH) to another type of hidden values such that two requirements are satisfied: (1) his 
hidden values can be used to match or authenticate his elements/credentials, (2) it is 
computationally infeasible to derive his real secrets from the hidden values. This is the 
key part of any PSI or SH protocols. Usually we use mathematic function with 
homomorphism to achieve the two conflicting goals simultaneously. This phase is called 
Secret Mapping. After the mapped secrets are sent back to Alice, she needs to compare 
the received hidden values with her own secrets. This phase is called Result Computing, 
which should satisfy two requirements: (1) Alice could compute the equality between 
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their secrets if they have matched elements/credentials, (2) otherwise, it is 
computationally infeasible for Alice to deduce Bob’s secrets from his hidden values. 
Now we propose a formal statement to illustrate the general design approach for both 
PSI and SH protocols. 
Statement II.1 To satisfy the general requirements of both PSI and SH protocols, we 
propose a general approach with three common phases: Protocol Initialization phase, 
Secret Mapping phase and Result Computing phase. The general approach for Alice 
(sender) and Bob (receiver) is as follows: (1) Alice initializes the 
matching/authentication protocol by sending her parameters to Bob in Protocol 
Initialization phase, (2) Bob received the parameters and maps his secrets to hidden 
values and sends the mapped values back to Alice in Secret Mapping phase, (3) Alice 
received the mapped values and compute whether they have matched 
elements/credentials in Result Computing phase. The difference between a PSI protocol 
and a SH protocol is that a party can manipulate the secret (i.e., self-generated elements) 
in PSI protocol and cannot do so (i.e., assigned credentials) in SH protocol. 
Now we present the detail of the three phases. For simplicity, we still assume that 
Alice is sender who initializes a matching/authentication protocol and Bob is the 
receiver who responds to Alice’s request.  The process is similar when Bob is the sender 
and Alice is the receiver.  
Phase I Protocol Initialization 
Alice sends several parameters to Bob to initialize a matching/authentication 
protocol. These parameters include:  
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PB: the base element of a chosen group G1, where a homomorphic operation * is defined 
and the inverse operation of * on G1 is hard (e.g., DLP or ECDLP) 
sA: Alice’s secret, which can be her elements, identity, pseudonym, etc. 
cA: the comparison key used to balance the equation for both PSI protocols and SH 
protocols. In PSI protocols cA is a random number used to guarantee that only Alice can 
compute the matching result. In SH protocol cA is a group secret of Alice’s group 
membership (credential).  
rA: a random number used to guarantee that only Alice’s secret/group secret cannot be 
deduced by Bob. 
R: a homomorphic randomization function that associates a secret with randomly 
chosen numbers in certain format. 
If Alice chooses to use the homomorphic randomization function and associate rA 
with her secret sA and send the mapped value to Bob, the general equation of this phase 
for PSI protocols is R(rA, cA, sA) = (rA×sA×cA)*PB, were * represents the homomorphic 
operation on G1 and × is the regular multiplication operation. For SH protocols the 
equation of this phase is R(rA, cA, sA) = (rA×sA)*PB. 
In this phase we propose to use R, a homomorphic randomization function, to 
allow Alice to associate the random numbers rA with her secret sA so that sA cannot be 
deduced from the randomized value. The randomization of R provides unlinkability for 
SH protocols and defense against dictionary attack for PSI protocols. In addition, the 
homomorphism of R guarantees that Bob can further modify Alice’s encrypted secrets, 
even if he does not know the chosen random number rA and sA.  
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Phase II. Secret Mapping 
After receiving Alice’s parameters, Bob will map his secrets to hidden values by 
using a secret mapping function. This phase includes the parameters and function as 
follows: 
sB: Bob’s secret, which can be her elements, identity, pseudonym, etc. 
cB: the comparison key used to balance the equation for both PSI protocols and SH 
protocols. In PSI protocols cB is a random number used to guarantee that only Alice can 
compute the matching result. In SH protocol cB is a group secret of Alice’s group 
membership (credential).  
rB: a random number used to guarantee that Bob’s secret/group secret cannot be deduced 
by Alice. 
M: a secret mapping function used to map sB (or cB) to a hidden value such that Alice 
can match/verify sB (or cB), and Alice cannot deduce sB (or cB) if matching/authentication 
fails. The equation of the secret mapping function for PSI protocls is M(R(rA, cA, sA), rB, 
cB, sB) = (rA×rB×cA×sA)*PB, (rA×rB×sB)*PB. The equation of the secret mapping function 
for SH protocol is M(R(rA, cA, sA), rB, cB, sB) = [(rA×sA)*PB]⊗[(rB×cB×sB)*PB], 
(rB×sB)*PB. 
In this phase PSI and SH have different requirements for M. For PSI protocol, 
since Alice (Bob) can compute and manipulate her (his) elements, the secret mapping 
function only consists of homomorphic operations represented by *. For SH protocols, 
since Alice (Bob) cannot compute or manipulate the group secret associate with her/his 
credentials, the secret mapping function also consists of a bilinear mapping function 
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represented  by ⊗. The theoretical basis is still same in Phase II for both PSI protocols 
and SH protocols. That said, in both kind of protocols Bob uses his random number rB to 
protect his secret sB and cB, while he also associates his rB with Alice’s transmitted 
messages through homomorphic operation or bilinear mapping for further possible 
comparison.   
Phase III. Result Computing  
After receiving Bob’s hidden values, Alice will compute the 
matching/authentication result by using a result computing function. It includes: 
C: a result computing function used to compute the matching/authentication result. It 
enables Alice to compute the result by comparing sA and sB, or cA and cB, and at the same 
time it prevents Alice from deducing sB or cB from the ciphertext directly. The equation 
of the result computing function for PSI protocols is: C(M(R(rA, cA, sA), rB, cB, sB)) ⇒ 
(rA×rB×cA×sA)*PB =? (rA×rB×cA×sB)*PB, where if sA = sB, the equation is satisfied. The 
equation for the result computing funciton for SH is C(M(R(rA, cA, sA), rB, cB, sB)) ⇒ 
[(rA×sA)*PB]⊗[( rB×CB×sB)*PB] =? [(rA×cA× sA)*PB]⊗[( rB×sB)*PB], where if cA = cB, 
the equation is satisfied. 
In this phase Alice uses the result computing function to find out the matched 
elements in PSI protocol or verified credentials in SH protocols. Basically Alice needs to 
put her comparison key on one side of the equation to balance it except of the comparing 
secrets, i.e., Alice associates her comparison key cA with Bob’s encrypted ciphertexts in 
both PSI protocols and SH protocol. The difference between PSI protocols and SH 
protocols is that the comparing secrets in the former are sA and sB and the comparing 
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secrets in the latter are cA and cB. For PSI protocol, both left side and right side have the 
same parameters except of the compared secrets sA and sB so that if sA = sB the equation 
is satisfied. For SH protocols, both left side and right side have the same parameters 
except of the comparison secrets cA and cB so that if cA = cB the equation is satisfied. 
During the computation, Alice cannot know anything about Bob’s secret sB and cB if the 
matching or verification fails because the randomization of HRF.  
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III. PRIVATE SET INTERSECTION (PSI) PROTOCOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous protocols have been proposed to achieve private set intersection. The 
first two-party private set matching protocol [24] was proposed based on homomorphic 
encryption scheme and polynomial equation evaluation. Let us assume that Alice and 
Bob both have a set of n attribute records for matching (equivalent to the term element 
used in [24]). In [24], Alice needs to map each record to one root of a polynomial 
equation, encrypts the coefficients of the equation through a homomorphic encryption 
scheme and sends the ciphertexts to Bob. Bob then can evaluate the polynomial based on 
the encrypted coefficients and his own records. Then the evaluated polynomial is sent 
back to Alice such that she can determine the matching outcome. The process needs 
O(n2) homomorphic encryptions (e.g., point multiplication in ECC) for Bob to evaluate 
the equation [24][26]. That is, for each input x (record), Bob needs to evaluate the whole 
n-term polynomial equation a0 + a1⊗x + a2⊗x2 +... + an⊗xn through n times operation 
of ⊗, which denotes the operation of a homomorphic encryption.  
The matching protocol in [24] was extended in [32] to support multiple parties 
and more set operations, e.g., union, cardinality of intersection, and multiplicity test. [33] 
further extended the polynomial-based approach by introducing a trusted third party that 
certified the inputs of both parties to prevent malicious active attacks, e.g., falsification. 
Another kind of private set intersection approach [27] was proposed based on oblivious 
pseudo-random function evaluation, which was more efficient than the polynomial 
evaluation based approaches. This approach is only secure for a relaxed adversary model. 
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In [34] an improved scheme based on pseudo-random function evaluation was proposed 
in the standard security model, in which users needed to commit their inputs before 
performing private set intersection. The most recent work reported in [35] also presented 
a linear crypto time, DDH based scheme for private set intersection that is secure against 
malicious adversaries.  
A privacy-enhanced matchmaking protocol [36] was proposed to support forward 
privacy of user’s identities, and matching wishes, etc. It was based on the password-
authenticated key exchange protocols [37]. A threshold homomorphic cryptosystem 
based privacy-preserving matching protocol was proposed in [38] for set intersection and 
set matching with reduced computing complexity. It was based on the combination of 
secret sharing and homomorphic encryption. Bilinear map was also used to design 
privacy-preserving set intersection protocol in [39]. Another privacy-preserving union 
protocol was proposed in [40] for criminal investigations.   
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) was first proposed in [41]. The idea of 
SMC was to enable a set of untrusting parties to compute certain function based on their 
own private inputs without revealing their private information except the common result 
of the function. The Fairplay two-party computation system proposed in [42] 
implemented generic secure function evaluation and solved several secure computation 
problems, e.g., Millionaires problem. Theoretically SMC is a general model proposed 
for privacy-preserving computation of any function, including computing of the 
intersection. However, due to their high computing and memory costs, they were not 
adopted for computing of intersection [23][24].  
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B. A PSI PROTOCOL BASED ON FULL HOMOMORPHISM 
A privacy-preserving element matching protocol based on full homomorphism is 
proposed in this section. The protocol is built on ECC [43][44]. Different with previous 
work [24][27][32][35], we propose to use a homomorphic randomization function in the 
Phase Initialization phase to achieve privacy-preserving matching of elements. More 
specifically, Alice (Bob) directly takes elements as secret numbers and associates them 
with chosen large random numbers such that elements cannot be derived. In addition, 
since the random numbers are generated through a homomorphic function, Alice (Bob) 
can modify Bob’s (Alice’s) associated values for privacy-preserving matching.  In 
comparison with [35], our scheme achieves the same computing complexity and 
communication complexity based on a totally different design and mathematical 
primitives, i.e., the homomorphism of ECC. 
First we need to generate some public parameters, (q, G1 Zq, H2, PB): q is a large 
prime number, G1 denotes an additive cyclic group of prime order q, Zq is a group with 
prime order q, H2 is a hash function that maps a string with arbitrary length to a string 
with fixed length, PB represents the base point (generator) of G1. Here G1 is selected in 
such a way that DLP [45] is assumed to be hard on it. In our design we choose G1 as a 
group of points on a chosen elliptic curve, where DLP is in the form of ECDLP [45].  
Definition III.1 Homomorphic Randomization Function in PSI. Suppose Alice has 
elements X = (x1, x2, …, xn). Alice uses hash function H2 to compute (H2(x1), H2(x2) ,…, 
H2(xn)) and chooses a large random number rA1 ∈ Zq. Alice multiplies (H2(x1), H2(x2) ,…, 
H2(xn) with rA1 and the base point PB and obtains (rAH2(x1)PB, rAH2(x2)PB ,…, rAH2(xn)PB 
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∈ G1. Bob also chooses his large random number rB1 ∈ Zq and multiplies it with Alice’s 
randomized values (rArBH2(a1)PB, rArBH2(a2)PB ,…, rArBH2(an)PB ∈ G1.  
To avoid the time-consuming polynomial evaluation, we directly use large 
random numbers to multiply elements to generate randomized elements and associate 
those with a fixed ECC point to guarantee their security property based on the ECDLP 
[45]. For example, given an element ai and its computed E(xi) = xirA1PB, where rA1 is a 
large random number and PB is a chosen ECC point, an attacker cannot use dictionary 
attack to confirm that xi has been used to generate E(xi). Then Alice sends her 
randomized elements to Bob such that Bob could associate (based on the 
homomorphism of HRF) his own elements to the received messages and send the 
mapped elements back to Alice. Then Alice can check the equality of their elements 
after computing the mapped elements. That is, Alice sends E(xi) to Bob, then Bob replies 
with his own randomized element E(yj) with E(xi). The key idea is to create the 
conditions such that, all other parameters in both E(yj) and E(xi) can be canceled and/or 
equalized by the computing procedures, except the elements xi and yj. Thus, when Alice 
checks the equality of E(yj) and E(xi)’, E(yj) = E(xi)’ if the two elements are indeed the 
same, otherwise E(yj) ≠ E(xi)’ and Alice cannot know yj. Bob can make the same 
matching through a similar procedure. Since all elements are processed in linearly 
encrypted format, this approach only requires a linear number of crypto operations. The 
flowchart of the proposed PSI protocol is depicted in Fig. 3. 
Suppose Alice has her input element set X = {x1, …, xn} and Bob has his input 
element set Y = {y1, …, ym}. Some public parameters, (q, G1, H1, PB), are used in the 
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design. Here q is a large prime number, G1 is chosen as the group of points on a chosen 
elliptic curve with prime order q, H1 is a hash function that maps a string of arbitrary 
length to a string of fixed-length, PB is the base point of G1. 
To start a round of matching between Alice and Bob, first they need to generate 
their own secret parameters. Alice computes an elliptic curve point kEA on the curve for 
encryption purposes using a secret number kDA and the base point PB: kEA = kDAPB (i.e., 
the standard point multiplication in ECC), where kDA ∈ Zq and kEA ∈ G1. Due to the well 
known ECDLP, kDA cannot be deduced, given kEA and PB. To guarantee that adversaries 
cannot find any element by trying every possibility (if the information space of elements 
is not very large) in a dictionary attack, Alice also needs to generate two large random 
integers rA1, rA2, ∈ Zq for information hiding (i.e., mapping element values to elements 
on a larger group). For example, an element xi cannot be deduced from (rA1xi)PB by any 
passive attack because rA1 and rA2 are large enough to guarantee the ECDLP. Following 
a similar argument, Bob also needs to generate kEB, kEB = kDBPB, and rB1, rB2, ∈ Zq. Then 
Alice uses E to generate the ciphertexts E(A) = [E(x1), E(x2) ,…, E(xn)] on the (hashed) 
input elements X, where each element E(xi) consists of two elliptic curve points as its 
“front” point and “back” point. The “front” points are produced by associating Alice’s 
chosen random numbers with base point PB. The “back” points are produced by 
associating both the random numbers and Alice’s records with her computed point kEA, 
where Alice’s elements cannot be deduced because of ECDLP. Alice then sends E(X) to 
Bob. After receiving E(X) Bob uses M and his own elements B to produce M[B, E(X)], 
i.e., modification of E(X). The modification function M allows Bob to (1) associate both 
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his own elements B and one chosen random number with the "front" points of E(X), and 
(2) associate the same random number with the "back" points of E(A). Again, Bob’s 
elements cannot be computed from the modified “back” points because of ECDLP. Then 
Bob sends his M[B, E(A)] back to Alice, who can use D to decrypt-and-then-evaluate the 
“front” and “back” points. After the decryption (i.e., eliminating the difference between 
the “front” points and “back” points caused by Alice’s own secret number and random 
number) if a pair of “front” point and “back” point are equal, Alice and Bob have an 
identical/matched element. Otherwise, their elements are different. Bob has symmetric 
operations as Alice and therefore will not be further repeated here. 
  
 
Fig. 3. The flowchart of the proposed PSI protocol. 
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Phase I Protocol Initialization 
In the follows we only describe Alice’s matching procedure since Bob’s is 
similar. Suppose Alice has input element set X = (x1, x2, …, xn) and Bob has input 
element set Y = (y1, y2, …, ym), respectively, where n and m are two chosen positive 
integers. First Alice generates her pairwise matching keys (kEA, kDA). kEA is used for 
encryption and kDA is used for decryption. Then Alice takes the input elements X = (x1, 
x2, …, xn) and uses her kEA to encrypt them to get the ciphertexts EA(X). The ciphertexts 
are then sent to Bob. After receiving EA(X), Bob modifies Alice’s ciphertexts and gets 
MB(EA(X) = MB(Y, EA(X)), where Y is Bob’s input elements and M() denotes a 
modification function with both Y and EA(X) as the inputs. Bob then sends the modified 
ciphertexts back to Alice. After receiving the modified encrypted elements, Alice uses 
the decryption function to decrypt the modified ciphertexts as DA(MB(EA(X)). Common 
elements between X and Y will be discovered after the decryption.  
In the follows we present the detail of the matching protocol. First Alice 
generates her pair of matching keys (kEA, kDA) based on the base element PB ∈ G1: kEA = 
kDAPB, where kDA ∈ Zq and kEA ∈ G1. Bob also generates his key pair in a similar way, 
i.e., kEB = kDBPB. Before exchange their elements for matching, Alice generates two 
large random integers rA1, rA2 ∈ Zq. Bob also generates his random integers rB1, rB2 ∈ Zq. 
Alice  then transfers her elements to large integers H2(X) = [H2(x1), H2(x2)… H2(xn)] and 
generate her ciphertexts by using the homomorphic function as EA(X) = [EA(x1), 
EA(x2), …, EA(xn)], where ∀ i ∈ [1, n], EA(xi) = (EAf, EA(xi)b)= (rA1PB, rA1H2(ai)kEA). Bob 
generates his ciphertexts in a similar way EB(Y) = [EB(y1), EB(y2), …, EB(ym)], where ∀ j 
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∈ [1, m], EB(yj) = (EBf, EB(yj)b)= (rB1PB, rB1H2(bj)kEB). The detail of the privacy-
preserving elements matching protocol is presented as follows: 
Phase II and Phase III: Element Mapping and Result Computing 
(1) Alice → Bob: EA(X) 
(2) Bob → Alice: EB(Y) 
(3) Alice: choose rA2 ∈ Zq, compute MA(EB(Y)) by using the homomorphic randomization 
function MA(EB(Y)) = [MA(EB(y1)),…, MA(EB(ym))] = [MA(EBf)1,…, MA(EBf)n)], 
[MA(EB(y1)b), …, MA(EB(ym)b)], ∀ i ∈ [1, n], MA(EBf)i = rA2H2(ai)EBf = rA2rB1H2(ai)PB; 
∀ j ∈ [1, m], MA(EB(yj)b) = rA2EB(yj)b) = rA2rB1H2(bj)kEB 
(4) Bob: choose rB2 ∈ Zq, compute MB(EA(X)) by using the homomorphic randomization 
function MB(EA(X)) = [MB(EA(x1)),…, MB(EA(xn))] = [MB(EAf)1,…, MB(EAf)m)], 
[MB(EA(x1)b), …, MB(EA(xn)b)], ∀ j ∈ [1, m], MB(EAf)j= rB2H2(bj)EAf = rB2rA1H2(bj)PB; 
∀ i ∈ [1, n], MB(EA(xi)b) = rB2EA(xi)b) = rB2rA1H2(ai)kEA 
(5) Alice → Bob: MA(EB(Y)) 
(6) Bob → Alice: MB(EA(X)) 
(7) Alice: for j = 1 to m, compute kDAMB(EAf)j, for i = 1 to n, j = 1 to m, test whether 
kDAMB(EAf)j = MB(EA(xi)b). If yes, put the corresponding element into X∩Y as the 
intersection set derived by Alice;  
(8) Bob: for i = 1 to n, compute kDBMA(EBf)i, for i = 1 to n, j = 1 to m, test whether 
kDBMA(EBf)i = MA(EB(yj)b). If yes, put the corresponding element into X∩Y as the 
intersection set derived by Bob; 
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Protocol I significantly reduces the computing costs. If n = m, both Alice and 
Bob need (4n + 6) (i.e., O(n)) point multiplications to compute the intersection: 1 
multiplication to generate the key pair, (n + 2) multiplications to generate the ciphertexts, 
(2n + 2) multiplications to execute modification on received ciphertexts, (n + 1) 
multiplications to execute decryption to decrypt the modified ciphertexts.  
Table 5 presents the comparison of computing costs of Protocol I and the PSI 
protocols proposed in [24][27]. Here n denote the number of elements of both Alice and 
Bob, and L is the bit length of each input element (assume all elements have the same 
length). Through Table 5 we can find that compared to [24][27] Protocol I has linear 
computation costs based on same security model and different cryptography 
fundamentals. 
 
Table 5. Comparison between PSI protocols. 
 
[24] [27] Protocol I Protocol II 
Computation Cost O(n2) O(nL) O(n) O(n) 
Communication 
Cost 
O(n) O(nL) O(n) O(n) 
Security Analysis Secure to passive 
attack 
Secure to passive 
attack 
Secure to passive 
attack 
Secure to 
passive attack 
Cryptography 
Fundamental 
Oblivious 
polynomial 
evaluation (OPE) 
Oblivious 
evaluation of 
pseudorandom 
function (OPRF) 
ECC-based full 
homomorphism 
and ECDLP 
ECC-based 
partial 
homomorphism 
and ECDLP 
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We consider any passive attack that aims at compromising confidentiality of 
sensitive information by analyzing transmitted messages, e.g., dictionary attack to 
transmitted messages. We consider both outside adversaries and inside adversaries in our 
research as follows.  
Outside adversary: a malicious user that is an outsider of a matching process. An 
outside adversary does not participate in the matching process and knows nothing about 
the transmitted messages.  
Inside adversary: a malicious user that participates in a matching process. The 
adversarial insider may have some matched elements with the targeted victim and try to 
discover other unmatched elements the victim has. 
Based on the adversary model and attack model introduced above, we claim that 
our privacy-preserving correlation technique provides the following security properties: 
Private Set Intersection and Elements Confidentiality. 
Theorem III.1 Element Confidentiality 
In Protocol 2 a polynomial-time passive adversary cannot learn what element a party 
owns. In other words, any polynomial-time adversary, either outside adversary or inside 
adversary, only has negligible probability to know which element a party owns without 
compromising legitimate owners of the targeted elements.  
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary Eve who aims at finding out the contents of some 
targeted element x. Eve may communicate with legitimate owners of the targeted 
element x, corrupt some valid users and obtain their elements. Here we use UT to denote 
the set of users who own the targeted element. Eve picks a target user uT∈ UT, and wants 
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to find out the element by communicating with uT. Now we define the Element Detection 
Game for a randomized, polynomial-time passive adversary A as follows: 
Step 1: The adversary Eve communicates with owners of the targeted element based on 
its own choice. Eve may compromise certain user UC ⊆ U and obtain their element, 
where UC denotes the set of compromised users and U denotes the whole user set. 
Step 2: Eve selects a target user uT ∉ UC and uT∈ UT, where users in UT own the targeted 
element x.  
Step 3: Eve generates x’ by communicating with uT. 
We say that Eve wins the Element Detection Game when x’ = x. Now we define the 
following probabilities P = Pr[Eve wins Element Detection Game]. When Eve does not 
compromise any valid owner of the targeted element x, the above probability becomes: 
P’
 (U
C∩U
T
)=∅ = Pr[Eve wins Element Detection Game | (UC∩ UT) = ∅]. Now we can 
define Element Confidentiality of our protocol. Suppose Eve never compromises a valid 
owner of the target x. In other words, (UC∩UT) =∅. Our protocol is said to have 
Element Confidentiality if P’(UC∩UT)=∅  is negligible for any passive adversary Eve. To 
prove that our protocol has the property, we first present the following theorem that has 
been proved in [24]: C’s Privacy is preserved and S’s Privacy is preserved. Now we 
compare our protocol with [24] and present the following corollary: If private set 
matching model proposed in [24] has preserved user’s privacy, then our matching 
protocol holds Element Confidentiality. The difference between our protocol and the PSI 
protocol proposed in [24] is that our protocol generates elliptic curve point as the user’s 
input ciphertexts and uses EA(X) and EB(Y) as user’s ciphertexts instead of the equation 
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ciphertexts in [24]. Because all ciphertexts are manipulated with single-use random 
number rA1/rB1 and rA2/rB2 through full ECC-based homomorphism, i.e., EA(xi) = (EAf, 
EA(xi)b)= (rA1PB, rA1H2(ai)kEA) and EB(yj) = (EBf, EB(yj)b)= (rB1PB, rB1H2(bj)kEB), by the 
assumptions that DLP is hard in G1, the ciphertexts hold the same security property as 
the ciphertexts do in [24]. Thus our protocol holds Element Confidentiality. 
Theorem III.2 Private Set Intersection  
In Protocol 2 matching parties only discover matched elements in the intersection set of 
their input elements.  In other words, one party only has negligible probability to 
compute the other party’s unmatched elements.   
Proof: the proof is similar to that of Theorem III.1 and omitted here. 
C. A PSI PROTOCOL BASED ON PARTIAL HOMOMORPHISM 
We note that the design of Protocol I is based upon the security framework of the 
private set intersection (PSI) protocol first proposed in [24], but we have developed a 
much more efficient algorithm for private computing of the set intersection. We used the 
full homomorphic randomization function to achieve the goal of privacy-preserving 
element matching. However, it is vulnerable to active attack. For example, H2(x)PB can 
be modified to H2(x’)H2(x)PB by adversaries. In this section we present a linear private 
set intersection protocol that is based on partial homomorphic randomization function. 
First we need to generate some public parameters, (q, G1 Zq, H2, PB): q is a large 
prime number, G1 denotes an additive cyclic group of prime order q, Zq is a group with 
prime order q, H2 is a hash function that maps a string with arbitrary length to a string 
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with fixed length, PB represents the base point (generator) of G1. Here G1 is selected in 
such a way that DLP [45] is assumed to be hard on it. 
Definition III.2 Partial Homomorphic Randomization Function in PSI. Suppose 
Alice has elements X = (x1, x2, …, xn). Alice uses hash function H2 to compute (H2(x1), 
H2(x2) ,…, H2(xn)) and chooses two large random numbers rA1, rA2 ∈ Zq. Alice multiplies 
(H2(x1), H2(x2) ,…, H2(xn) with rA1 and rA2 and the base point PB to obtain: ∀ i ∈ [1, n], 
E(xi)f = rA1rA2-1PB ∈ G1 and E(xi)b = [rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA ∈ G1. Bob also chooses his 
elements Y = (y1, y2, …, ym) and a large random number rB3∈ Zq and multiplies it with 
Alice’s randomized values to obtain: ∀ j∈ [1, m], M(yj)f = H2[rB3H2(yj)E(xi)f + rB3PB] 
and ∀ i∈ [1, n], M(xi)b = rB3E(xi)b. 
This protocol consists of three major functions: an encryption function E, a 
decryption function D and a modification function M. Let X= (x1, …, Xn) and Y = (y1, …, 
ym) respectively represent the set of elements owned by Alice and Bob. First Alice and 
Bob need to generate their own secret parameters. Alice computes an elliptic curve point 
kEA on the chosen elliptic curve for encryption purposes using a secret number kDA and 
the base point PB: kEA = kDAP (i.e., the standard point multiplication in ECC), where kDA 
∈ Zq and kEA ∈ G1. Due to the well known ECDLP, kDA cannot be deduced, given kEA 
and PB. To guarantee that adversaries cannot find any element by trying every possibility 
(the information space of alert attributes is usually not very large) in a dictionary attack, 
Alice also needs to generate three large random integers rA1, rA2, rA3 ∈ Zq for information 
hiding (i.e., mapping record values to elements on a larger group). For example, a 
element xi cannot be deduced from (rA1xi + rA2)P by any passive attack because rA1 and 
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rA2 are large enough to guarantee the ECDLP. Following a similar argument, Bob also 
needs to generate kEB, kEB = kDBPB, and rB1, rB2, rB3 ∈ Zq. 
Now we introduce the basic procedures of the matching scheme from Alice’s 
side. First Alice uses E to generate the ciphertexts E(X) = [E(x1), E(x2) ,…, E(xn)] on 
the (hashed) input elements E, where each element E(xi) consists of two elliptic curve 
points as its “front” point and “back” point. The “front” points are produced by 
associating Alice’s chosen random numbers with base point PB. The “back” points are 
produced by associating both the random numbers and Alice’s elements with her 
computed point kEA, where Alice’s records cannot be deduced because of ECDLP. 
Alice then sends E(X) to Bob. After receiving E(X) Bob uses M and his own elements B 
to produce M[Y, E(X)], i.e., modification of E(X). The modification function M allows 
Bob to (1) associate both his own elements Y and one chosen random number with the 
"front" points of E(X), and (2) associate the same random number with the "back" 
points of E(X). Again, Bob’s elements cannot be computed from the modified “back” 
points because of ECDLP. Then Bob sends his M[Y, E(X)] back to Alice, who can use 
D to decrypt-and-then-evaluate the “front” and “back” points. After the decryption (i.e., 
eliminating the difference between the “front” points and “back” points caused by 
Alice’s own secret number and random number) if a pair of “front” point and “back” 
point are equal, Alice and Bob have an identical/matched element. Otherwise, their 
records are different. Bob has symmetric operations as Alice and therefore will not be 
further repeated here. Details of the protocol are discussed as follows.  
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Protocol II. Linear Private Set Intersection Protocol Based on Partial 
Homomorphic Randomization Function  
(1) Alice: generate E(X) = [E(x1), E(x2) ,…, E(xn)], ∀ i ∈ [1, n], E(xi) = [E(xi)f , E(xi)b], 
where E(xi)f = rA1 rA2-1PB, and E(xi)b = [rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA  
(2) Bob: generate E(Y) == [E(y1), E(y2),…, E(ym)], ∀ j ∈ [1, m], E(yj) = [E(yj)f , E(yj)b], 
where E(yj)f = rB1 rB2-1PB, and E(yj)b = [rB1H2(yj) + rB2]kEB 
(3) Alice ↔ Bob: Alice sends E(X) to Bob and Bob sends E(Y) to Alice 
(4) Alice: compute M[X, E(Y)]. M[X, E(Y)] = [M(x1)f , M(x2)f ,…, M(xn)f ], [M(y1)b , 
M(y2)b ,…, M(ym)b ]. ∀ i∈ [1, n], M(xi)f = H1[rA3H2(xi)(rB1rB2-1)PB + rA3PB] = 
H2[(rA3rB1rB2-1H2(xi) + rA3)PB]. ∀ j∈ [1, m], M(yj)b = rA3[(rB1H2(yj) + rB2)kEB] = 
[rA3rB1H2(yj) + rA3rB2]kEB  
(5)  Bob: compute M[Y, E(X)]. M[Y, E(X)] = [M(y1)f , M(y2)f ,…, M(ym)f ], [M(x1)b , 
M(x2)b ,…, M(xn)b ]. ∀ j∈ [1, m], M(yj)f = H2[rB3H1(yj)(rA1rA2-1)PB + rB3PB] = 
H2[(rB3rA1rA2-1H2(yj) + rB3)PB]. ∀ i∈ [1, n], M(xi)b = rB3[(rA1H2(xi) + rA2)kEA] = 
[rB3rA1H2(xi) + rB3rA2]kEA 
(6) Alice ↔ Bob: Alice sends M[X, E(Y)] to Bob, and Bob sends M[Y, E(X)] to Alice 
(7) Alice: compute D{M[Y, E(X)]}: for i = 1 to n, compute H1[kDA-1rA2-1M(xi)b]. For i = 
1, 2, … n, j = 1, 2, … m, test whether H2[kDA-1rA2-1M(xi)b] = M(yj)f, if yes, xi is a 
matched record in the intersection.  
(8) Bob: compute D{M[X, E(Y)]}: for j = 1 to m, compute H1[kDB-1rB2-1M(yj)b]. For i = 1, 
2, … n, j = 1, 2, … m, test whether H2[kDB-1rB2-1M(yj)b] = M(xi)f. If yes, yj is a 
matched record in the intersection 
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We use the multiplications of large random numbers with ECC points to protect 
user’s elements from dictionary attacks, i.e., H2(xi) cannot be deduced from E(xi)b = 
[rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA. In addition, we also use H2 on M[X, E(Y)] and M[Y, E(X)] such that 
Alice (or Bob) cannot further manipulate the received ciphtertexts as ECC points. 
Otherwise, inside adversaries, e.g., Alice, could launch dictionary attack to try every 
possible values for elements to get an equivalent equation between H2[kA-1rA2-1M(xi)b] 
and M(yj)f. 
If n = m, both Alice and Bob need (4n + 6) (i.e., O(n)) point multiplications to 
compute the intersection: one multiplication to associate secret number with the base 
point, (n + 2) multiplications to generate the ciphertexts (step 1 or step 2), (2n + 2) 
multiplications to execute M on received ciphertexts (step 5 or step 6), (n + 1) 
multiplications to execute D on the modified ciphertexts (step 9 or step 10) for 
decryption.  
One possible attack to Protocol II is that an attacker pretends to have the full set 
of elements, and sends the elements to another user for matching. An easy detection of 
such an attack is that when a user receives an extremely large amount of encrypted 
elements for matching, he can choose to not continue the matching process and does not 
send his modified elements back to the requester. 
Protocol II significantly reduces the computing costs. If n = m, both Alice and 
Bob need (4n + 6) (i.e., O(n)) point multiplications to compute the intersection: 1 
multiplication to generate the key pair, (n + 2) multiplications to generate the ciphertexts, 
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(2n + 2) multiplications to execute modification on received ciphertexts, (n + 1) 
multiplications to execute decryption to decrypt the modified ciphertexts.  
Table 5 above presents the comparison of computing costs of Protocol II and the 
PSI protocols proposed in [24][27] and Protocol I. Here n denote the number of elements 
of both Alice and Bob, and L is the bit length of each input element (assume all elements 
have the same length). Through Table 5 we can find that compared to [24][27] Protocol 
II has linear computation costs based on same security model and different cryptography 
fundamentals. In addition, compared with Protocol I, Protocol II is based on partial 
homomorphism, which is more secure against some kind of active attacks.  
In this section we show that Protocol II is more secure against active attacks like 
falsification. First we can see that Protocol I is vulnerable to active attack. For example, 
H2(x)PB can be modified to H2(x’)H2(x)PB by adversaries. If H2(x’)H2(x)PB happens 
represent another element, i.e., H2(x’)H2(x) = H2(y), the participating party will believe 
that there is a party who owns y. It is a falsification attack. Protocol II is not vulnerable 
to this attack since all elements are encrypted in format like E(xi) = [E(xi)f , E(xi)b], 
where E(xi)f = rA1rA2-1PB, and E(xi)b = [rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA. It is hard for an adversary to 
manipulate rA1rA2-1PB or [rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA since he does not know both rA1, rA2 and kEA. 
For example, if an adversary adds a chosen element to the ciphertext like H2(x’)[rA1H2(xi) 
+ rA2]kEA, the participating parties cannot verify the modified ciphertext since it is not 
under the correct format. Thus, Protocol II is more secure against active attacks.  
In Protocol II we also consider any passive attack that aims at compromising 
confidentiality of sensitive information by analyzing transmitted messages, e.g., 
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dictionary attack to transmitted messages. We consider both outside adversaries and 
inside adversaries in our research as follows. The main discussions of the adversaries are 
same as that for Protocol I and are omitted here. 
Based on the adversary model and attack model introduced above, we claim that 
our privacy-preserving correlation technique provides the following security properties: 
Private Set Intersection and Elements Confidentiality. 
Theorem III.3. Element Confidentiality 
In Protocol II a polynomial-time passive adversary cannot learn what element a party 
owns. In other words, any polynomial-time adversary, either outside adversary or inside 
adversary, only has negligible probability to know which element a party owns without 
compromising legitimate owners of the targeted elements.  
Proof: Suppose there is an adversary Eve who aims at finding out the contents of some 
targeted element x. Eve may communicate with legitimate owners of the targeted 
element x, corrupt some valid users and obtain their elements. Here we use UT to denote 
the set of users who own the targeted element. Eve picks a target user uT∈ UT, and wants 
to find out the element by communicating with uT. Now we define the Element Detection 
Game for a randomized, polynomial-time passive adversary A as follows: 
Step 1: The adversary Eve communicates with owners of the targeted element based on 
its own choice. Eve may compromise certain user UC ⊆ U and obtain their element, 
where UC denotes the set of compromised users and U denotes the whole user set. 
Step 2: Eve selects a target user uT ∉ UC and uT∈ UT, where users in UT own the targeted 
element x.  
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Step 3: Eve generates x’ by communicating with uT. We say that Eve wins the Element 
Detection Game when x’ = x. Now we define the following probabilities P = Pr[Eve 
wins Element Detection Game]. When Eve does not compromise any valid owner of the 
targeted element x, the above probability becomes P’
 (U
C∩U
T
)=∅ = Pr[Eve wins Element 
Detection Game | (UC∩
 
UT) = ∅]. Now we can define Element Confidentiality of our 
protocol. Suppose Eve never compromises a valid owner of the target x. In other words, 
(UC∩UT) =∅. Our protocol is said to have Element Confidentiality if P’(UC∩UT)=∅  is 
negligible for any passive adversary Eve. To prove that our protocol has the property, we 
first present the following theorem that has been proved in [24]: C’s Privacy is preserved 
and S’s Privacy is preserved. Now we compare our protocol with [24] and present the 
following theorem corollary: If private set matching model proposed in [24] has 
preserved user’s privacy, then our matching protocol holds Element Confidentiality. The 
difference between our protocol and the PSI protocol proposed in [24] is that our 
protocol generates elliptic curve point as the user’s input ciphertexts and uses EA(X) and 
EB(Y) as user’s ciphertexts instead of the equation ciphertexts in [24]. Because all 
ciphertexts are manipulated with single-use random number rA1/rB1 and rA2/rB2 through 
ECC-based partial homomorphism, i.e., E(xi) = [E(xi)f , E(xi)b], where E(xi)f = rA1rA2-1PB, 
and E(xi)b = [rA1H2(xi) + rA2]kEA and E(yj) = [E(yj)f , E(yj)b], where E(yj)f = rB1 rB2-1PB, 
and E(yj)b = [rB1H2(yj) + rB2]kEB, by the assumptions that DLP is hard in G1, the 
ciphertexts hold the same security property as the ciphertexts do in [24]. Thus our 
protocol holds Element Confidentiality. 
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Theorem III.4. Private Set Intersection  
In Protocol 2 matching parties only discover matched elements in the intersection set of 
their input elements.  In other words, one party only has negligible probability to 
compute the other party’s unmatched elements.   
Proof: the proof is similar to that of Theorem III.3 and omitted here. 
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IV. SECRET HANDSHAKE (SH) PROTOCOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The original secret handshake protocol [25] was proposed to achieve privacy-
preserving credential authentication between two parties. The main disadvantage of their 
protocol is that credentials assigned from the CA are single-use and each party needs to 
withdraw a large number of credentials to keep their identities unlinkable. The reason of 
this weak point is that pseudonyms and group secret are combined to consist of 
credentials and are separated for use in privacy-preserving authentication process [25]. 
More specifically, every credential assigned from the CA has two components, a 
pseudonym and a group secret, associated together. Since the group secret cannot be 
separated from the credential (i.e., a regular party cannot know the value of the group 
secret), pseudonyms are exchanged in plaintext for authentication of the credentials.  
This actually breaks a user’s unlinkability and may even compromise the group 
membership detection resistance since adversaries can always track a repeatedly used 
pseudonym to get to know who the user is and which group he belongs to, i.e., using 
pseudonyms separately compromises the security of the group secret. In the follows we 
propose a formal theorem to illustrate the vulnerability: 
Theorem IV.1 Linkability with Reusable Credential 
A privacy-preserving authentication protocol that uses one plaintext pseudonym for 
multiple authentication sessions does not hold anonymity or group membership 
detection resistance.  
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Proof: Suppose Alice requests a CA to join the group gA. The CA grants the group 
membership to Alice by issuing a credential credAi = f(gA, idAi), where gA represents the 
group secret and idAi represents Alice’s assigned pseudonym. Alice cannot deduce gA 
from f(gA, idAi). There are two adversaries Mallory and Mallet who want to know 
whether they are interacting with same party and which affiliation this party belongs to. 
Assume that Mallory and Mallet are not members in group gA. Now we define an 
identity detection game as follows.  
(1) Mallory sends a message to Alice and Mallet sends a message to Alice. Each of them 
sends the message to request for an authentication session.  
(2) Alice responds with his assigned pseudonym idAi to both Mallory and Mallet. 
(3) Mallory communicates with Mallet and they both know that they are interacting with 
a same user with pseudonym idAi in two executions of the authentication protocol.  
(4) Alice is linkable. 
Now we assume that Mallet is also a member of group gA and we define a group 
membership detection game as follows.  
(1) Mallory sends a message to Alice and Mallet sends a message to Alice. Each of them 
sends the message to request for an authentication session.  
(2) Alice responds with his assigned pseudonym idAi to both Mallory and Mallet. 
(3) Mallory completes an execution of the authentication protocol with Alice and knows 
nothing about Alice. Mallet also completes an execution of the authentication 
protocol with Alice and knows that Alice is also a member of gA.   
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(4) Mallet communicates with Mallory and they both know that they are interacting with 
a group member of gA with pseudonym idAi.  
(5) Alice is linkable and confidentiality of her group membership is compromised. 
There is more related work proposed in this area. An unlinkable SH scheme with 
reusable credentials is proposed by Ateniese et al. [28], which has stronger security 
properties than ours since it is proved to be secure in the standard model. On the other 
hand, our scheme needs less computing time, based on the random oracle mode. 
Experimental results [28] show that their scheme needs 0.78 seconds on average to 
complete an unlinkable handshake, including the key generation and credential 
verification. They also adopted the abstract model in [24] to achieve approximate 
attribute-based matching using each round of authentication as a matching exercise. As 
such, their algorithm is more close to a CA based privacy management model, because 
the CA knows all user attributes in order to issue credentials for users to engage in 
matching.  
  A recent related work in [46] was the first one that achieves unlinkability without 
relying on single-use certificates and it supports revocation. But their work does not 
support interlocked authentication and matching for unequal sets of attributes and in 
their scheme a user’s sensitive information must be revealed to a CA. 
B. AN UNLINKABLE SH PROTOCOL WITH REUSABLE CREDENTIAL 
 In this section, we present our secret handshake protocol with reusable 
credentials. Our main idea is to use the homomorphic randomization function in the 
Protocol Randomization phase to randomize user’s assigned pseudonyms to provide 
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reusability of credentials. More specifically, we let a user generate a secret random 
number in execution of the secret handshake. The user multiplies the random number to 
an elliptic curve point that represents the user’s pseudonym. The random number 
minimizes the correlation among authentication messages even they are produced by 
reuse of the same credential. First we present the parameters that are required in the 
secret handshake protocol as (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2): q is a large prime number, G1 denotes 
an additive cyclic group of prime order q, G2 denotes a multiplicative cyclic group of the 
same order q, H1 is a collision-free hash function that maps a string with arbitrary length 
to an element in G1, H2 is a collision-free hash function that maps a string with arbitrary 
length to a string with fixed length, and e denotes a bilinear map. G1 and G2 are selected 
in such a way that DLP [45] is assumed to be hard in both of them. The bilinear map e in 
our protocol is a pairing that satisfies the following conditions: 
Definition VI.1 Bilinear Pairing. A pairing is a bilinear map e: G1 × G1 → G2 if, for 
any P, Q ∈ G1 and any a, b ∈ Z*q we have e(a⋅P, b⋅Q) = e(a⋅P, Q)b = e(P, b⋅Q)a = e(P, 
Q)a⋅b and  e(P,Q) = e(Q, P) 
 To provide efficient computation of the bilinear map, we choose G1, G2 and e as 
a set of points on an elliptic curve, a multiplicative cyclic group over integers and Tate 
pairing, respectively. There is a special discrete logarithm problem, Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [43] [44], defined as the basis of elliptic curve 
cryptosystem (ECC) [43][44]. Based on the parameters chosen above, another 
assumption we need is the BDH Assumption described as follows: 
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Definition VI.2 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption [45]. Given P, aP, bP, cP 
for random a, b, c ∈ Z*q and P ∈ G1, it is not possible to compute e(P, P)abc with a non-
negligible probability, i.e., it is hard to compute e(P, P)abc 
In the follows we present the detail of the use of the homomorphic randomization 
in our proposed secret handshake protocol.  
Definition VI.3 Homomorphic Randomization Function in SH. Suppose user Alice 
joins a group gA by obtaining a pair of pseudonym idAi and credential credAi = f(gA, idAi) 
= gA⋅H1(idAi). Here gA ∈ G2 represents the group secret, idAi is an arbitrary string that 
represents Alice’s assigned pseudonym, H1 is a function that maps a string to an element 
in G1 and f is the addition operation defined in G1. Alice selects a large random integer 
rA1 ∈ G2, and uses the addition operation defined in G1 to compute rdAi = rA1H1(idAi) (i.e., 
rA1 times of addition on gAH1(idAi)). 
In my design there is a central authority (CA) that assigns credentials to two 
principals, Alice and Bob. Alice has her identity IDA and Bob has his identity IDB. The 
CA is also responsible for generating the parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2), where q 
denotes a large prime number, G1 denotes the group of points on a chosen elliptic curve 
with prime order q, G2 denotes a multiplicative cyclic group of order q, e denotes a 
bilinear map: G1 × G1 → G2, H1 maps a string with arbitrary length to an element in G1, 
H2 maps a string with arbitrary length to a string with fixed length. The CA also 
generates a set of group secrets (g1,…, gn), ∀ gi ∈ Z*q, gi represents the membership of a 
group. The main idea of the SH protocol is to let a principal generate a secret large 
random integer in every secret handshake. The principal multiplies the random number 
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to an elliptic curve point that represents his identity. The random number minimizes the 
correlation among authentication messages even they are produced by reusing the same 
credential. The flowchart of the proposed SH protocol is presented in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4. The flowchart of the proposed SH protocol. 
 
As described in the proposed framework, our proposed secret handshake protocol 
has three phases: Protocol Initialization, Group Secret Mapping and Authentication 
Computing. In the follows we present the detail of the three phases. 
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Protocol III. Unlinkable Secret Handshake Protocol with Reusable Credential 
Phase I Protocol Initialization 
The CA determines the pairing parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2) and group 
secrets GS = (g1,…, gw), where ∀ gi ∈ G2. The CA publishes the pairing parameters 
while keeping the group secrets in private. Alice requests the CA to join the group with 
group secret gA ∈ (g1,…, gw). The CA verifies Alice’s qualification to decide whether 
Alice can join the group. If yes, the CA grants the group membership to Alice by issuing 
her a pair of pseudonym idAi and credential credAi = gAH1(idAi) ∈ G1, as described above. 
The credential is a secret of Alice to prove her membership in group gA to another user 
in the same group. Alice cannot deduce gA from gAH1(idAi) and H1(idAi) by the 
assumption that DLP is hard in G1. It is important for preventing forgery of credentials. 
Bob also obtained his pair of pseudonym idBj and credential credBj = gBH1(idBj) in a 
similar process. Users Alice and Bob use their credentials, credAi = gAH1(idAi) and credBj 
= gBH1(idBj), to generate authentication messages to one another. Alice randomly 
generates two large random numbers, rA1 and rA2. Alice computes rdAi = rA1H1(idAi), as 
described in the homomorphic randomization function above. That said, rA1 is used to 
minimize the correlations of authentication messages produced by the same pair of 
pseudonym and credential. Since using a credential multiple times will not create 
messages that can link to the user identity, our credential is reusable. rA2 prevents replay 
attacks as described in [6]. Bob also randomly generates two large numbers, rB1 and rB2, 
for the same purpose. Detailed interactions of group secret mapping phase and 
authentication computing phase are described as follows: 
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Phase II Secret Mapping and Phase III Result Computing 
(1) Alice →Bob: rA2, rdAi = rA1H1(idAi)  
(2) Bob: Compute VB = H2(e(rdAi, rB1credBj) || rA2 || rB2 || 0). Here Bob implements the 
secret mapping function to map his own credential credBj = gBH1(idBj) from an 
element in G1 to an element in G2 through bilinear map e.   
(3) Bob →Alice: rB2, rdBj = rB1H1(idBj), VB 
(4) Alice: Compute VB(A) = H2(e(rdBj, rA1credAi) || rA2 || rB2 || 0). If VB(A) = VB, then Alice 
knows Bob belongs to the same group, i.e., gA = gB. Otherwise, Bob belongs to a 
different group, i.e., gA ≠ gB or Bob belongs to no group. Here Alice implements the 
result computing function to find out whether H2(e(rdBj, rA1credAi) || nA1 || nB1 || 0) = 
H2(H2(e(rdAi, rB1credBj) || nA1 || nB1 || 0).   
(5) Alice →Bob: VA = H2(e(rdBj, rA1credAi) || rA2 || rB2 || 1) 
(6) Bob: Compute VA(B) = H2(e(rdAi, rB1credBj) || rA2 || rB2 || 1). If VA(B) = VA, Bob knows 
that Alice belongs to the same group. Otherwise, Alice belongs to a different group, 
i.e., gA ≠ gB or Alice belongs to no group. 
The protocol succeeds when VB(A) = VB and VA(B) = VA in steps (d) and (f). Based 
on the BDH assumption [7], it succeeds if, and only if, gA = gB. Otherwise, if it fails, 
Alice and Bob only know gA ≠ gB. Users other than Alice and Bob cannot know whether 
gA = gB or not, because they cannot compute VA or VB without credAi and credBj. A 
sketch of proof for VB(A) = VB when gA = gB is shown in (1). The rest of proof for VA(B) = 
VA can be derived similarly.  
VB(A) = H2(e(rdBj, rA1credAi) || rA2 || rB2 || 0)  
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 = H2(e(rB1H1(idBj), rA1gA⋅H1(idAi)) || rA2 || rB2 || 0) 
 = H2(e(H1(idBj), H1(idAi)) rA1rB1gA || rA2 || rB2 || 0) 
  = H2(e(rA1H1(idAi), rB1gBH1(idBj)) || rA2 || rB2 || 0) (if gA = gB) 
 = H2(e(rdAi, rB1credBj) || rA2 || rB2 || 0)   
 = VB             (3. 1) 
Table 6 show the comparison of computation costs and communication costs 
between Protocol II and the SH protocols proposed in [25][28]. Here n denotes the 
number of runs of a SH protocol and d denotes the threshold of the number of 
overlapped elements defined by Alice and Bob. My solution has less computation cost 
compared to [28] and less communication costs compared to [25], under different 
security model. 
 
Table 6. Comparison between SH protocols. 
 
[25] [28] Protocol III 
Computation Cost O(1) O(2d + 1) O(1) 
Communication 
Cost 
O(n) O(2d + 1) O(1) 
Security Analysis Secure to passive 
and active attack 
Secure to and active 
passive attack 
 Secure to and active 
passive attack 
Cryptography 
Fundamental 
Random oracle 
model 
Standard model ECC-based 
homomorphism and 
random oracle model 
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In the proposed secret handshake protocol we consider any passive attack that 
aims at compromising confidentiality of sensitive information by analyzing transmitted 
messages, e.g., dictionary attack to transmitted messages. We consider both outside 
adversaries and inside adversaries as follows.  
Outside adversary: a malicious party that is an outsider of an authentication 
process. An outside adversary does not participate in the authentication process and 
knows nothing about the transmitted messages.  
Inside adversary: a malicious party that participates in an authentication process. 
The adversarial insider may have some matched group secrets with the targeted victim 
and try to discover other unmatched group secrets the victim has. 
Based on the adversary model and attack model introduced above, we claim that 
our privacy-preserving correlation technique provides the following main security 
properties: unlinkability with reusable credential, group membership authenticity, group 
membership detection resistance. In Theorem IV.2 we first prove that a secret handshake 
that uses homormorphic randomization function provides unlinkability with reusable 
credential.  
Theorem IV.2: Unlinkability on Homomorphic Randomization with Reusable 
Credential 
A privacy-preserving authentication protocol that uses homomorphic randomization 
function in protocol initialization phase guarantees unlinkability with reusable credential.  
Proof: Suppose Alice requests to join a group with group secret gA ∈ G2. The CA grants 
the group membership to Alice by issuing a credential gA⋅H1(idAi) ∈ G1, where idAi 
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represents Alice’s assigned pseudonym associated with gA. Alice cannot deduce gA from 
gA⋅H1(idAi). There are two adversaries, Mallory and Mallet, who want to know whether 
they are interacting with same party and which group this party belongs to. Assume that 
Mallory is not a member in group gA and Mallet is. Mallory sends a message to Alice to 
request an execution of Protocol III. Mallet also sends the request. Alice executes the 
protocol with both Mallory and Mallet. In the execution with Mallory Alice uses rdAi = 
rA1⋅H1⋅(idAi) as her pseudonym, where rA1 is a randomly chosen number in group G2. In 
the execution with Mallet Alice uses rdAi’ = rA1’⋅H1⋅(idAi) as her pseudonym, where rA1’ 
is another randomly chosen number in group G2. All other parts of the executions are 
same as what has been described in Protocol III. Mallet may also communicate with 
other legitimate owners of group secret gA. Here we use UA to denote the set of users 
who own the group secret gA. Now we define a Linkability Detection Game as follows.  
Step 1: Mallory and Mallet communicate with Alice based on their own choices. From 
Mallory’s viewpoint, he is interacting with party A1; from Mallet’s viewpoint, he is 
interacting with party A2.  
Step 2: Mallet
 
selects other parties UA and corrupt them. 
Step 3: After the executions of the secret handshake protocol Mallory and Mallet want to 
find out whether A1 = A2. If yes, they know that they are interacting with a same party 
and since Mallet knows that A2 has group secret gA, Mallory also knows.   
We say that Mallory and Mallet win the Linkability Detection Game if they find out that 
A1 = A2. Now we define the following probabilities: P = Pr[Mallory and Mallet win 
Linkability Detection Game] – 0.5. Here we say that our protocol holds unlinkability 
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with reusable credential if P
 is negligible for any polynomial-time adversaries Mallory 
and Mallet. In our protocol Alice generates random numbers rA1 and rA1’ to manipulate 
his assigned pseudonym idAi and get elliptic curve points rdAi = rA1⋅H1(idAi) and rdAi’ = 
rA1’⋅H1(idAi) as his randomized pseudonyms for Mallory and Mallet, respectively. Here 
rdAi and rdAi’ are generated to map Alice’s pseudonym idAi to random ECC points 
through the homomorphic randomization function. By the assumptions that DLP is hard 
in G1, no polynomial-time adversary cannot deduce rA1 and rA1’ from rdAi = rA1⋅H1(idAi) 
and rdAi’ = rA1’⋅H1(idAi) and thus cannot know rdAi and rdAi’ are generated based on the 
same pseudonym idAi. That said, their guess about whether A1 = A2 is no better than a 
random guess. Thus, our protocol holds unlinability with reusable credential. 
Theorem IV.3: Group Membership Authenticity 
In Protocol III any polynomial-time adversary only has negligible probability of 
cheating as a valid owner of some group membership without corrupting another valid 
owner of the targeted group secret, i.e., the adversary cannot impersonate owners of 
some targeted group secret.  
Proof: suppose there is an adversary Trudy who aims at impersonating the owner of a 
group secret gA. Trudy may communicate with legitimate owners of the targeted gA, 
corrupt some valid users and obtain their secrets. Here we use UT to denote the set of 
users who own the targeted gA. Trudy picks a target user uT∈ UT, and wants to convince 
u
T
 that Trudy is also an owner of the targeted gA, i.e., Trudy ∈ UT. We define the Group 
Membership Owner Impersonation Game for a randomized, polynomial-time adversary 
Trudy as follows.  
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Step 1: The adversary Trudy communicates with owners of the targeted gA based on its 
own choice. Trudy may compromise users UC ⊆ U and obtain their secrets, where UC 
denotes the set of compromised users and U denotes the whole user set.   
Step 2: Trudy selects a target user uT ∉ UC and uT∈ UT, where users in UT own the 
targeted gA. 
Step 3: Trudy wants to convince uT that Trudy owns the gA, i.e., Trudy ∈ UT. 
We say that Trudy wins the Group Membership Owner Impersonation Game if it 
convinces uT that it is an owner of gA. Now we define the following probabilities: P = 
Pr[Trudy wins Group Membership Owner Impersonation Game]. When Trudy does not 
compromise any valid owner of gA, the above probability becomes: P’(UC∩UT)=∅ = 
Pr[Trudy wins Group Membership Owner Impersonation Game | (UC∩
 
UT)=∅]. Here 
we say that our protocol holds Group Membership Authenticity if P’(UC∩UT)=∅  is 
negligible for any polynomial-time adversary Trudy. We first present the following 
theorem that has been proved in [25]: C’s Authenticity is preserved and S’s Authenticity 
is preserved. In this work we define P’UC∩UT)=∅ as the probability when an adversary 
Trudy wins the Group Membership Owner Impersonation Game without compromising 
any valid owner of gA in UT. Now we compare our protocol with the abstract model [25] 
and present the following corollary: Our secret handshake protocol holds Group 
Membership Authenticity. The difference between our protocol and the abstract model 
[25] is that our protocol generates elliptic curve point as the user’s randomized identities. 
Here rdAi/rdBj are generated to map Alice’s/Bob’s pseudonyms to random ECC points. 
Since all pseudonyms are manipulated with single-use random number rA1/rB1 as random 
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oracles and DLP is hard in G1, group secret and user’s pseudonyms are not deducible 
from the randomized values. In addition, our protocol holds the original BDH 
assumption that any polynomial-time adversary cannot derive the authentication value 
and group secret from the transmitted messages. As a result, Group Membership 
Authenticity holds in our secret handshake protocol. 
Theorem IV.4: Group Membership Detection Resistance 
In Protocol III any polynomial-time adversary only has negligible probability of 
detecting a targeted party’s group secret without corrupting another valid owner with the 
same group secret. In other words, given an arbitrary group secret, the adversary’s guess 
about whether it is same as a targeted party’s group secret is no better than a random 
guess. 
Proof: the proof is similar to Theorem IV.3 and omitted here.   
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V. INTERLOCKED PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this section we present two new privacy-preserving protocols by interlocking 
the proposed PSI protocol and the proposed SH protocol. In the first interlocked protocol 
a PSI protocol is executed first and the matched elements are obtained. Then the 
matched elements are associated with an assigned credential in a following SH protocol. 
Authenticity is provided on matched elements in this protocol since they are associated 
with the credential by using the homomorphism property in SH protocol. In the second 
interlocked protocol a SH protocol is executed first and credentials with same group 
secret are verified if the handshake succeeds. Then a common value is generated based 
on the verified credentials. This value is used in a following PSI protocol as common 
homomorphic random number. Detection resistance and impersonation resistance are 
provided in this protocol since adversaries cannot launched the detection and 
impersonation attack if they cannot compromise the executed SH protocol and know the 
common value.  
B. A SECRET HANDSHAKE PROTOCOL WITH MATCHING ELEMENTS 
In this section, we present our secret handshake protocol with matching elements. 
It means that we execute a private set intersection protocol first and compute the 
matching elements, and then we execute a secret handshake for privacy-preserving 
authentication of both credentials and matching elements. We use the credentials that 
have the matching elements associated with the group secret. First we present the 
parameters that are required in the protocol as (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2): q is a large prime 
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number, G1 denotes an additive cyclic group of prime order q, G2 denotes a 
multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q, H1 is a collision-free hash function that 
maps a string with arbitrary length to an element in G1, H2 is a collision-free hash 
function that maps a string with arbitrary length to a string with fixed length, and e 
denotes a bilinear map. G1 and G2 are selected in such a way that DLP is assumed to be 
hard in both of them. 
Definition V.1 Homomorphic Randomization Function in SH Protocol with 
Matching Elements. Suppose user Alice joins a group gA by obtaining a credential 
gAH1(idA), where gA ∈ G2 represents the group secret and idA ∈ G1 represents Alice’s 
assigned pseudonym. Suppose Alice also has some matching elements with another user 
Bob as (xy1, xy2, …, xyw). Alice selects a large random integer rA1 ∈ G2, and uses the 
addition operation defined in G1 to compute rA1⋅ H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw)⋅gA⋅H1(idA). 
As described in Fig. 5, there are 10 steps between Alice and Bob to execute the 
authentication protocol with matching elements. We illustrate the process on Alice’s side 
since Bob’s side is similar. After Alice withdrew her credential from the central 
authority, she executes the matching protocol with Bob and computes the intersection of 
their input sets. If the number of common elements is beyond a threshold, she continues 
interact with Bob by executing the authentication protocol. During the execution she 
associates the intersection with the group secret issued from the CA.  Then after secret 
handshake if it succeeds, then Bob has the same group membership with and the 
intersection and Alice can continue any further interaction. Otherwise, either Bob does 
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not own the same group membership or he is an adversary launching man-in-the-middle 
attack. 
 
 
Fig. 5. A secret handshake protocol with matching elements. 
 
Protocol IV. A Secret Handshake Protocol with Matching Elements 
Our proposed protocol has three phases: Protocol Initialization, Group Secret 
Mapping and Authentication Computing. In the follows we present the detail of the three 
phases. 
Phase I Protocol Initialization  
The CA prepares the system parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2) and a series of 
group secrets [g1, g2, …]. The group secrets are known by the CA only. Other 
parameters are published to users. Alice requests the CA to join the group gA. The CA 
verifies Alice’s user identity to decide whether Alice can join the group. If yes, the CA 
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grants the group membership to Alice by computing the credentials credA = gA⋅H1(idA). 
Alice can use this credential to prove that it belongs to group gA to other users in the 
same group. Suppose Alice and Bob have matching elements (xy1, xy2, …, xyw). If w is 
larger than a threshold determined by Alice, she chooses one large random number rA1 ∈ 
G2 and calls the homomorphic randomization function to compute rA1H2(xy1|| xy2||…|| 
xyn)gAH1(idA) directly. Similarly, Bob has his credential credB = gB⋅H1(idB) and computes 
rB1H2(xy1|| xy2||…||xyn)⋅gB⋅H1(idB). Alice and Bob randomly generate two non-zero 
integers, rA2 and rB2, to prevent replay attack. Detailed interactions of our secret 
handshake protocol are described as follows.  
Phase II Secret Mapping and Phase III Result Computing 
(1) Alice →Bob: rA2, rdA = rA1⋅H1(idA) 
(2) Bob: Compute VB = H2(UB||rA2||rB2||0), UB = e(rdA, rB1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw)gBH1(idB)). 
Here Bob implements the secret mapping function to map his own credential credB = 
gB⋅H1(idB) from an element in G1 to an element in G2 through bilinear map e.   
(3) Bob →Alice: rB2, rdB = rB1H1(idB), VB 
(4) Alice: VB(A) = H2(U’B||rA2||rB2||0), U’B = e(rdB, rA1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw)gAH1(idA)). If 
VB = VB(A), then Alice knows Bob belongs to the same group, i.e., gA = gB, and 
verifies Bob’s matching elements H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw). Otherwise, Bob belongs to a 
different group, i.e., gA ≠ gB or Bob does not own the matching elements. Here Alice 
implements the result computing function to find out whether H2(U’B ||rA2||rB2||0) = 
H2(UB ||rA2||rB2||0).   
(5) Alice →Bob: VA = H2(U’B || rA2 || rB2 || 1) 
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(6) Bob: Compute VA(B) = H2(UB || rA2 || rB2 || 1). If VA = VA(B), Bob knows that Alice 
belongs to the same group, i.e., gA = gB, and verifies Alice’s matching elements 
H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw). Otherwise, Alice belongs to a different group, i.e., gA ≠ gB or 
Alice does not own the matching elements. 
Theorem V.1. Authenticity on Matching Elements in SH Protocol with Matching 
Elements 
A privacy-preserving authentication protocol that uses homomorphic randomization 
function in protocol initialization phase and associates matching elements with assigned 
credentials guarantees authenticity on the matching elements.  
Proof: Suppose Alice and Bob execute a PSI protocol and obtain their matching element 
as (xy1, xy2, …, xyw). Suppose there is an adversary Trudy, who executes a classic man-
in-the-middle attack to Alice and Bob. Trudy intercepts the messages transmitted 
between Alice and Bob and acts as Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice. Since in the proposed 
PSI protocol Alice (Bob) modifies Bob’s (Alice’s) ciphertexts by mapping his (her) own 
elements into hidden values and associating the values with the ciphertexts, the 
transmitted messages contain both Alice’s and Bob’s mapped elements. As a result, 
Trudy can successfully prove to Alice (Bob) that he has the matching elements as Bob 
(Alice) does. In our new secret handshake protocol, Alice (Bob) computes verification 
value as rA1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw)gAH1(idA) (rB1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyn)gBH1(idB)) by 
associating the matching elements with assigned credentials. Since in our secret 
handshake protocol no sensitive information are contained in the transmitted values and 
rA2 and rB2 are included to generate single-use verification value, Trudy cannot 
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successfully launch man-in-the-middle attack as long as he cannot deduce 
H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyn) from rA1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyw)gAH1(idA) or 
rB1H2(xy1||xy2||…||xyn)gBH1(idB)). As a result, Trudy cannot verify himself as the owner 
of (xy1, xy2, …, xyw) and our protocol guarantees authenticity of matching elements on 
homomorphic randomization.     
C. A PSI PROTOCOL WITH VERIFIED CREDENTIALS 
In this section, we present our private set intersection protocol with verified 
credentials. It means that we execute a secret handshake protocol first and verify the 
assigned credentials, and then we execute a private set intersection for privacy-
preserving matching of elements. First we present the parameters that are required in the 
protocol as (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2). Here q is a large prime number, G1 denotes an additive 
cyclic group of prime order q, G2 denotes a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order 
q, H1 is a collision-free hash function that maps a string with arbitrary length to an 
element in G1, H2 is a collision-free hash function that maps a string with arbitrary 
length to a string with fixed length, and e denotes a bilinear map. G1 and G2 are selected 
in such a way that DLP is assumed to be hard in both of them. 
The main idea to execute an authentication protocol following a matching 
protocol for Alice and Bob is to use the SH protocol to verify each other’s group 
membership first and then utilize the verification outcome to protect the execution of the 
matching protocol in two ways. If the secret handshake fails, Alice (Bob) can terminate 
the interaction with Bob (Alice) since they do not belong to the same group. If the 
handshake succeeds, Alice and Bob can manipulate the common verification value to 
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generate pairwise session keys to build a secure communication channel for further 
execution of matching protocols. In addition, they can associate the verification value 
with their matching process to defend against impersonation attack. In the follows we 
present the detail. 
Definition V.2 Homomorphic Randomization Function in PSI Protocol with 
Verified Credentials. Suppose Alice joins group gA by obtaining a credential gAH1(idA), 
where gA ∈ G2 represents the group secret and idA represents Alice’s assigned 
pseudonym. After Alice executed a SH protocol with Bob, they can compute some 
common verification VAB if the handshake succeeds. Suppose Alice will also execute a 
PSI protocol with Bob. Alice associates the verification value H2(VAB||0) as a large 
random number with her encrypted elements. She puts H2(VAB||0) only in back points of 
her ciphertext. 
Protocol V. A Private Set Intersection Protocol with Verified Credential 
Our proposed protocol has three phases: Protocol Initialization, Element 
Mapping and Matching Result Computing. In the follows we present the detail of the 
three phases.  
Phase I. Protocol Initialization 
The CA prepares the system parameters (q, G1, G2, e, H1, H2) and a series of 
group secrets [g1, g2,…]. The group secrets are known by the CA only. Other parameters 
are published to users. Alice requests the CA to join the group gA. The CA verifies 
Alice’s user identity to decide whether Alice can join the group. If yes, the CA grants the 
group membership to Alice by computing the credentials [gA⋅H1(idA)]. Alice can use this 
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credential to prove that it belongs to group gA to other users in the same group. Similarly 
Bob also has his credential [gB⋅H1(idB)]. Alice and Bob execute a SH handshake protocol 
to verify whether gA = gB, i.e., whether they have the same group membership. If no, 
Alice (Bob) can choose to terminate the interaction with Bob (Alice). If yes, they can use 
the common verification value to generate a pairwise session key as VAB = 
H2(UA||rA2||rB2||2) = H2(UB||rA2||rB2||2). Then Alice and Bob can use a symmetric key 
cryptosystem like AES to build a secure channel between them with VAB as the 
encryption and decryption key. That said, all the transmitted messages presented below 
are encrypted and decrypted using VAB as the key. 
Suppose Alice has element set X = (x1, x2, …, xn) and Bob has element set Y = (y1, 
y2, …, ym) where n and m are two chosen integers. In the follows we only describe 
Alice’s matching procedure since Bob’s is similar. First Alice generates her pairwise 
matching keys (kEA, kDA). kEA is used for encryption and the latter one is used for 
decryption. Then Alice takes the input elements X and uses her kEA to encrypt them to 
get the ciphertexts EA(X). The ciphertexts are then sent to Bob. After receiving EA(X), 
Bob modifies Alice’s ciphertexts and gets MB(EA(X) = MB(Y, EA(X)) where Y is Bob’s 
input elements and M() denotes a modification function with both Y and EA(X) as inputs. 
Bob then sends the modified ciphertexts back to Alice. After receiving the modified 
encrypted elements, Alice uses the decryption function to decrypt the modified 
ciphertexts as DA(MB(EA(X)). Common elements between X and Y will be discovered 
after the decryption.  
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In the follows we present the detail of the first phase. First Alice generates her 
pair of matching keys (kEA, kDA) based on the base element PB ∈ G1: kEA = kDA × PB, 
where kDA ∈ Zq and kEA ∈ G1. Bob also generates his key pair in a similar way, i.e., kEB = 
kDB × PB. Before exchange their elements for matching, Alice generates two large 
random integers rA1, rA2 ∈ Zq. Bob also generates his random integers rB1, rB2 ∈ Zq. In 
addition, Alice computes H2(VAB||0) as another parameter for the matching process. First 
Alice needs to transfer her elements to large integers, i.e., H2(X) = [H2(x1), H2(x2)… 
H2(xn)]. She then uses the encryption key kEA and H2(VAB||0) to generate her ciphertexts 
as EA(X) = [EA(x1), EA(x2), …, EA(xn)], where ∀ i ∈ [1, n], EA(xi) = (EAf, EA(xi)b)= (rA1PB, 
rA1H2(ai)H2(VAB||0)kEA). Bob also generates his ciphertexts in a similar way. He 
computes H2(VAB||1) as his parameter in the matching process. He then generates his 
ciphertexts in a similar way EB(Y) = [EB(y1), EB(y2), …, EB(ym)], where ∀ j ∈ [1, m], 
EB(yj) = (EBf, EB(yj)b)= (rB1PB,rB1H2(bj)H2(VAB||1)kEB). The detail of the privacy-
preserving elements matching protocol is presented as follows: 
Phase II Secret Mapping and Phase III Result Computing 
(1) Alice → Bob: EA(X) 
(2) Bob → Alice: EB(Y) 
(3) Alice: compute H2(VAB||1) and choose rA2 ∈ Zq, then compute MA(EB(Y)) by using the 
homomorphic randomization function MA(EB(Y)) = [MA(EB(y1)),…, MA(EB(ym))] = 
[MA(EBf)1,…, MA(EBf)n)], [MA(EB(y1)b), …, MA(EB(ym)b)], ∀ i ∈ [1, n], MA(EBf)i = 
rA2H2(ai)H2(VAB||1)EBf = rA2rB1H2(ai)H2(VAB||1)PB; ∀ j ∈ [1, m], MA(EB(yj)b) = 
rA2EB(yj)b= rA2rB1H2(bj) H2(VAB||1)kEB  
68 
(4) Bob: compute H2(VAB||0) and choose rB2 ∈ Zq, then compute MB(EA(X)) by using the 
homomorphic randomization function MB(EA(X)) = [MB(EA(x1)),…, MB(EA(xn))] = 
[MB(EAf)1,…, MB(EAf)m)], [MB(EA(x1)b), …, MB(EA(xn)b)], ∀ j ∈ [1, m], MB(EAf)j= 
rB2H2(bj)H2(VAB||0)EAf = rB2rA1H2(bj)H2(VAB||0)PB; ∀ i ∈ [1, n], MB(EA(xi)b) = 
rB2EA(xi)b) = rB2rA1H2(ai) H2(VAB||0)kEA 
(5) Alice → Bob: MA(EB(Y)) 
(6) Bob → Alice: MB(EA(X)) 
(7) Alice: for j = 1 to m, compute kDAMB(EAf)j, for i = 1 to n, j = 1 to m, test whether 
kDAMB(EAf)j = MB(EA(xi)b). If yes, put the corresponding element into X∩Y as the 
intersection set derived by Alice;  
(8) Bob: for i = 1 to n, compute kDBMA(EBf)i, for i = 1 to n, j = 1 to m, test whether 
kDBMA(EBf)i = MA(EB(yj)b). If yes, put the corresponding element into X∩Y as the 
intersection set derived by Bob; 
Theorem V.2. Detection Resistance and Impersonation Resistance on Matching 
Elements in PSI Protocol with Verified Credential  
A privacy-preserving element matching protocol that uses homomorphic randomization 
function in protocol initialization phase and associates verified credential with matching 
elements guarantees impersonation attack resistance on the matching elements.  
Proof: Suppose Alice and Bob execute a SH protocol, and the handshake succeeds. 
Alice and Bob can use the value to generate a secret pairwise session key VAB = 
H2(UA||rA2||rB2||2) = H2(UB||rA2||rB2||2), and use the key to build a secure 
communication channel by encrypting and decrypting all transmitted messages. The first 
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part of Theorem V.2 is obvious since only Alice and Bob know the session key and no 
passive attack can be successfully launched on messages transmitted in the secure 
channel. Suppose there is an adversary Trudy, who executes an impersonation attack by 
launching attacks like replay attack to Alice and/or Bob. Trudy intercepts the messages 
transmitted between Alice and Bob.  Trudy then acts as a legitimate party by sending 
Bob’s initialization message to Alice or Alice’s initialization message to Bob. Since in 
the original PSI protocol Alice (Bob) modifies Bob’s (Alice’s) ciphertexts by mapping 
his (her) own elements into hidden values and associating the values with the ciphertexts, 
the transmitted messages contain both Alice’s and Bob’s mapped elements. As a result, 
Trudy can successfully prove to Alice (Bob) that he has the matching elements. In our 
new protocol, Alice (Bob) computes ciphertexts of matching elements as 
EA(xi)=(EAf,EA(xi)b)=(rA1PB,rA1H2(ai)H2(VAB||0)kEA) (EB(yj)=(EBf,EB(yj)b)= 
(rB1PB,rB1H2(bj)H2(VAB||1)kEB)) by putting the common verification value in the latter 
ciphertexts. Since in our secret handshake protocol no sensitive information are 
contained in the transmitted values and rA2 and rB2 are included to generate single-use 
verification value, Trudy cannot successfully launch replay attack as long as he cannot 
know the VA or VB or VAB. As a result, our protocol guarantees detection resistance and 
impersonation attack resistance on matching elements. 
 
 
 
 
70 
VI. APPLICATIONS ON PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS 
In Section VI the proposed PSI and SH protocols are implemented to build 
privacy-preserving inquiry matching (PPIM) for social network applications and 
privacy-preserving alert correlation (PAC) independent network alert sources.  
A. SOCIAL PRIVACY-PRESERVING INQUIRY MATCHING APPLICATION 
Social networking services (SNS), e.g., Facebook [29], Opensocial [47], 
Match.com [48], LinkedIn [49] etc., are rapidly expanding from their casual usage of 
making social contacts to more serious applications of building professional contacts, 
e.g., PartnerUp [50], Sermo.com [51], INmobile.org [52], etc.  The rich collection of 
personal and contact information in SNS systems makes them the prime target of 
adversary. As the industry gradually yet surely pushes SNS to the next level of high-
value applications, it is critical to examine the privacy management issues in order to 
protect consumer privacy without sacrificing the convenience of existing systems.  
A typical system architecture for most SNS is depicted in Fig. 6, where an SNS 
vendor makes its web portal available for free or paid services, i.e., posting and 
browsing of photos, trivia, personal, or business information. Consumers can use the 
discovery/search service in SNS to locate potential contacts using typical search cues, 
such as personal interests, names, or locations, etc., and the SNS providers may also 
make contact suggestions based on consumer profiles. Users can follow search outcomes 
to make new contacts based on a simple handshaking protocol, “friend invitation and 
approval”. A business related SNS usually has more rigorous control on user registration, 
e.g., Sermo.com [51] for physicians and INmobile.org [52] for senior professionals of 
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the wireless industry. While this type of SNS vendors usually employ registration 
screening, pseudonyms and message encryption to protect user privacy, there is  no 
broadly adopted privacy preserving matching techniques to protect the inquires being 
used in matching processes. 
 
 
Fig. 6. A typical SNS architecture. 
 
Privacy breaching can happen in many different ways, and it is hard to contain 
them completely. By agreeing to the service policies, consumers knowingly or 
unknowingly permit the SNS providers to make supposedly sanitized/aggregated data 
[53][54] available to third party application developers [55], or the general data market 
[54]. However, in practice, the adversary can still recover sensitive information from the 
sanitized data, e.g., professional aggregators [56][57][58], de-anonymizer tool [59] for 
employers [60], decoding of social connection based on P2P techniques [61]. More 
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seriously, third party vendors may not have as high standards on consumer privacy 
protection as the leading vendors [62][63][64]. As an increasing number of privacy 
breaching incidents begin to emerge, either by exploiting system vulnerabilities 
[65][66][67][68], or accidental or intentional release of personal data [69][70][71], we 
claim that the overall security strength of existing SNS is not adequate to support current 
social networking applications. Many designs have been proposed, e.g., 
[2][5][40][62][72][73][74][75][76] to address those issues. Most of them are to allow 
user to control their own private information and deploy the security policy based on 
their own requirement, as illustrated in Fig. 7. The problem is that they are primarily 
focused on the last step, e.g., how to allow a user to control the content/profiles shared 
with his matched friends so that they do not leak unnecessary information [5][77]. Given 
the fact that SNS providers usually control the phases of user registration and user 
discovery, the privacy protection for the middle step is largely ignored, i.e., how to find 
matched and/or authenticated friends in a privacy-preserving manner. Without this, users 
may already leak their sensitive information before they can control their shared/public 
social data. 
In this section we proposed a new system, privacy-preserving inquiry matching 
(PPIM), to address the problem. In PPIM, attributes of matching inquiries are 
considered highly privileged information to the owners, e.g., new drugs [51], product 
pricing [52], personal health/finance status [78], etc. Often, group affiliation is also 
considered privileged information [54]. As such, a principal may only allow peers to 
establish connection when he/she (1) has the same inquires attributes, (2) registered to 
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the same group, or (3) both of above. Conceptually, one could treat matching of 
attributes and verification of membership affiliation problems as two independent 
problems, and they can be solved using the existing private set intersection (PSI) 
protocol [24] and the secret handshaking (SH) algorithm [25], respectively. Or, a user 
can verify the membership with others first before proceeding to matching of privileged 
attributes. However,  the PSI algorithm alone is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack 
[79] and replay attack [80], because the adversary can first passively relay packets 
between two users until they made successful making, and then become active to 
impersonate either/both of them to hijack subsequent communications. Moreover, the 
original SH algorithm may not be scalable for large systems because a user needs to 
request and store a large number of single-use pseudonyms to maintain anonymity and 
unlinkability, which is crucial for protecting group affiliation information. 
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Fig. 7. Current privacy protections for SNS. 
 
We propose to use the proposed interlocked protocol to enhance PSI and SH 
algorithms so that they can more effectively serve the needs of PPIM applications. There 
are three steps to use the interlocked protocol on PPIM. The first step is to implement 
the PSI algorithm using the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) cryptosystem, in order to 
lower its computing costs. The second step is to use the proposed unlinkable secret 
handshake protocol so that consumers just need to register once from a particular Group 
Administrator (GA) to engage in PPIM activities. The third step is to interlock the PSI 
and SH by proper selection of the elliptic curve parameters and functions, and making 
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the outputs produced in PSI as a part of the computing inputs to SH. Two principals 
engaged in a PPIM transaction could first run the PSI protocol, and then feed the 
matched results (in a derived form) to the SH protocol for authentication. Or, they could 
first run SH protocol to authenticate each other, and then use a common “session key” 
derived from the SH to make it a part of the attributes, so that the adversary cannot 
engage in the PSI protocol without the common key. By bundling SH with PSI, the 
proposed PPIM protocol can defend against the man-in-the-middle attack [79] and 
replay attack [80]. Running PSI first and then SH, vs., SH first and then PSI some subtle 
differences in their security implications, but both are equally doable. We will focus on 
the PSI-SH, but the theoretical basis is also applicable to the SH-PSI design. Another 
advantage of our design is that two users can generate a pairwise session key after a 
successful PSI-SH execution. This way, the PPIM system can directly cooperate with 
systems like flyByNight [5] or Persona [77] without the need of a complex key 
distribution infrastructure.  
A common concern for any on-line applications is the notion of Sybil attack 
[66][81], in which an adversary uses ghost accounts to gain unduly benefits, e.g., starting 
a hype, gaining control of a virtual group, etc. Many techniques have been proposed in 
the literature to detect such misbehaviors [82][83][84]. We assume that trade groups for 
high-value applications have stringent registration processes similar to those in [51][52] 
to eliminate ghost accounts in PPIM user community. The rigorous matching and 
authentication procedures make it much easier for GA to sanction against their 
misbehaved group members based on reputation or similar punitive systems. 
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The architecture of the proposed PPIM scheme and its relationship with respect 
to existing SNS systems is depicted in Fig. 8. The only additional infrastructure 
requirement for the PPIM service is a PPIM relay server, which can be a part of existing 
SNS, or an independent system. It serves the simple purpose of listing potential 
matching candidates, and relaying of PPIM related messages between two matching 
candidates.  In plaintext, a PPIM inquiry Q consists of a set of attributes T and 
credentials C, Q=(T,C), where T= [t0, t1, …, tn], and C= [c0, c1, …, cm], where ci is issued 
by GAi. The contents of T and C, including their sizes, are determined based on personal 
choices or some best practice of the trade. An element ti in T represents one of the n 
items to be matched with others, and the user can choose any subset of T for a PPIM 
transaction. Each element ci in C represents a point on a chosen elliptic curve generated 
from a number of expressions. Some derivatives of selected elements in C will be sent to 
other users during different PPIM transactions. Each user also has a unique identity, ID, 
in a group, from each registered GA. The ID will be solely used as a piece of private 
data to run the SH protocol, and it should not be confused with common user accounts. 
In PPIM we propose to adopt existing SNS as the platform for strangers to make 
their first contacts, i.e., discovery of candidates using non-privileged information 
[29][47][49], peer recommendation [52], or pseudonyms [54], etc. From the list of 
candidates produced from the discovery process, users can proceed to the next level of 
(privacy-preserving) matching based on our proposed scheme. The PPIM relay server is 
interfaced to SNS, so that when users wish to proceed with PPIM matching, their public 
profiles can be posted. Once two users agree to enter a PPIM transaction to match their 
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inquiries, all messages exchanged between them are essentially ciphertexts. We use the 
interactions between three users Alice, Bob, and Mallory to illustrate the overall system 
concept. Conceptually, any two users Alice and Bob exchange encrypted attributes 
through the PPIM relay server for the matching of },...,,{ 10 anaaa tttT =
 
and
 
},...,,{
'10
b
n
bbb tttT = , 
and then verify if they have made the same PSI matching results, and also have one or 
more common affiliations (governed by the same GA). At end of a transaction, Alice 
and Bob can either affirmatively identify their matched attributes, with verified common 
membership; or neither of them will gain any hint about the attributes nor the 
membership of the counterpart. The transaction is immune from passive man-in-the-
middle attack.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Architecture of the PPIM service. 
 
Overall, when Alice
 
is engaged in a PPIM transaction, it needs to submit three 
types of messages (in addition to some other messages), [ ))(( aaa TME ; )( aia cw ; )( aia cv ] for 
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PSI and SH protocols. ))(( aaa TME  is the ciphertext of )( aTM  generated by Alice,  where  
M(Ta) is the results of mapping of Ta based on a mapping function M.  
Alice, Bob and Mallory exchange all PSI related messages through the PPIM 
server. We will use Alice to carry the rest of discussions, because identical arguments, 
except for the variables involved, are applicable to all users. Assuming that Alice first 
sends out ))(( aaa TME to Bob and Mallory. Then, Bob sends its own ))(( bbb TME  and returns 
the modified inquiry )))((( aaab TMEF   back to Alice. )))((( aaab TMEF  is computed by Bob using 
a known homomorphic encryption method  with Tb as its input. Similarly, Mallory also 
sends ))(( mmm TME  and )))((( ammm TMEF  to Alice. Then, Alice can use the received messages 
to perform its PSI computing locally. Bob and Mallory can perform similar PSI 
computing after they receive their modified inquires.  
For Alice to perform SH protocol with both Bob and Mallory, the related 
message exchanges are derived from the PSI matching outcomes, and the credentials of 
Alice. To verify that Alice and Bob are in the same group, Alice needs to prove that 
)( aia cv  = )( bjab cv , which denote  verification values generated by Alice and Bob, 
respectively.  )( aia cv  is generated by a generation function G based on bilinear pairing 
[45][85].  )( bjab cv  is computed by the verification function V of Bob, based on )( aia cw  and 
Bob’s own  credential bjc . )( aia cw  (generated by Alice) is 2-tuple: (1) a single-use number 
na, and (2) the hashed, and then randomized aiID , which is issued by GAi as Alice’s 
ID in groupi. 
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Let },...,,{ 10 amaaa cccC =  and },...,,{ '10 bmbbb cccC = for denote credentials for Alice and Bob, 
respectively. We summarize the five security properties (P1 to P5) of PPIM scheme 
based on the scenario that Alice does PPIM transaction with Bob. For (Alice, Bob), all 
others are considered outsiders.     
Attribute Confidentiality: Alice and Bob can find whether Ta ∩ Tb ≥ δa, δb where 
δa, δb are threshold values chosen by Alice and Bob, respectively. For all attributes ait ∈ 
Ta and ait ∉ T
a
 ∩ Tb, ait  is not revealed to Bob. Similarly, for all bjt ∉ T
a
 ∩ Tb, bjt  is not 
revealed to Alice. Ta and Tb is not revealed to outsiders. 
Attribute Authenticity: Alice and Bob can find whether or not Ca ∩ Cb ≥ δa’, δb’ 
where δa’, δb’ are threshold values chosen by Alice and Bob, respectively, where “ aic  
=
b
jc ” means that they are issued by the same GA. For all credentials aic ∈ C
a
 and aic ∉ C
a
 
∩ Cb, aic  is not revealed to Bob. Similarly, for   all credentials
  
b
jc ∉ C
a
 ∩ Cb, bjc  is not 
revealed to Alice. Ca and Cb is not revealed to outsiders. 
Message Privacy: No message exchanged between Alice
 
and Bob can be 
deciphered by outsiders. 
Relationship Privacy:  Outsiders cannot know whether or not Alice and Bob have 
a positive or negative match. 
Unlinkability: No message can be linked to aiID  , bjID  . 
The interlocked PSI protocol is the Protocol I proposed in Section III.B. To make 
it more efficient in PPIM, we made the following changes: first off, a supersingular 
elliptic curve [85] ς is used for both PSI and SH to reduce the complexity of curve 
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selection. In actual implementation of M, we modified the original hash function in [86] 
with decreased parameter size so that attributes chosen from a relatively small space can 
be fit into the relatively smaller number of points on ς. We still adopted the classic hash 
function SHA-1 [87] as H2. In addition, our system architecture is an end-user controlled 
privacy management model that does not require providing anyone privileged inquiry 
information, except those who can successfully complete PPIM transactions with the 
information owner.  
The SH is the Protocol III proposed in Section IV. B. The SH is built upon the 
bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) intractability assumption. By choosing the Tate pairing 
for SH design, it satisfies the bilinearity and degeneracy of BDH. Selection of the 
paring-based functions and parameters follows the discussions in [45].  
Fig. 9 presents the flowchart of our ECC-based PSI scheme. When Alice and 
Bob exchange messages, they need to generate their public keys (PUBa and PUBb) and 
private keys (PRIa and PRIb) from the base element Q ∈ G1, where G1 denotes an 
additive cyclic group of prime order q (which is a large prime number). Here we choose 
the group of points on a pairing-friendly curve ς to be G1, in which DLP is known as 
ECDLP [45]. It is required that PUBa = PRIa × Q, where PRIa ∈ Fq and PUBa ∈ G1 (F 
denotes a finite filed). Similarly, PUBb = PRIb × Q. PRIa is chosen by Alice, and PRIb 
by Bob. After Alice
 
picks aT , she uses a global mapping function M to generate 
},...,,{)( 110 anaaaa sssTM += , which is encrypted to ),...,(),({))(( 10 aaaaaaa sEsETME =  )}( 1ana sE + using 
PUBa and an encryption function E. Alice sends ))(( aaa TME  to Bob. After receiving it, 
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Bob
 
uses a modification function F to modify ))(( aaa TME
 
into
 
)}(),...,(),({)))(((
'10
b
n
a
b
ba
b
ba
b
a
aab tFtFtFTMEF =
 
with ))(( aaa TME
 
and some of his own attribute data in 
bT  as the inputs to F. Here, F needs to satisfy the homomorphic encryption property. 
Next, Bob sends )))((( aaab TMEF
 
back to Alice, who can then decipher the 
received )))((( aaab TMEF  by using a decryption function D and her private key PRIa. The 
deciphered outcomes represent identical hashed values of original attributes, and they 
can be readily used to produce ),( ba TTIS , the intersection of Ta and Tb. 
Then, Alice chooses δa as a threshold and checks whether or not the number of 
elements in IS(Ta, Tb), NUM(IS(Ta, Tb)), is larger than δa. If yes, ),( ba TTIS  is used as the 
input to the SH engine for credential authentication. Bob goes through a fairly similar 
process to match attributes submitted by Alice. The protocol satisfies the security 
properties P1, P3 and P4. Here we can only briefly highlight them as follows. For P1, 
Bob cannot deduce aT  because of the hardness of ECDLP in G1, i.e. Bob cannot deduce 
ra from raPUBa (in step 2) and thus cannot get ais  from aaai PUBrs + . Similarly, Alice 
cannot deduce bT . Alice cannot deduce extra elements not in IS(Ta, Tb) because those 
elements are hidden by the multiplication of rb to ∑
+
=
1
0
2 )()(
n
i
il
ib
j EtH  in F. Bob also cannot deduce 
any extra elements not in SIB for similar reasons. For P3, all messages transmitted are in 
encrypted format. Due to ECDLP is hard in G1, message privacy is maintained. For P4, 
thresholds δa and δb are chosen by Alice and Bob respectively and whether the matching 
results satisfies each user’s requirement, e.g., NUM(IS(Ta, Tb)) ≥ δa, is only known to 
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them. The detail of the interlocked PSI protocol was presented in Section III. B and is 
omitted here. 
},...,,{ 10 anaaa tttT =
},...,,{)( 110 anaaaa sssTM +=
)}(),...,({))(( 10 anaaaaaa sEsETME +=
},...,,{
'10
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n
bbb tttT =
},...,,{)( 1'10 bnbbbb sssTM +=
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))(( bbb TME ))(( aaa TME
)}(),...,({)))((( 0 anbaababbba tFtFTMEF = )}(),...,({)))(((
'0
b
n
a
b
ba
b
a
bab tFtFTMEF =
)),((
?
ba
a TTISNUM≥δ
),( ba TTIS
)),((
?
ab
b TTISNUM≥δ
),( ab TTIS
)}(),...,({)))(((
'0
b
n
a
b
ba
b
a
bab tFtFTMEF = )}(),...,({)))((( 0 anbaababbba tFtFTMEF =
 
Fig. 9.  ECC-based PSI protocol in PPIM. 
 
The SH protocol is illustrated in Fig. 10. A matched pair of Alice and Bob both 
have a common attribute set contained in IS(Ta, Tb) and IS (Tb, Ta), but neither of them 
can tell if the PSI transaction was done with  Mallory, i.e., the “man in the middle” 
adversary. If Mallory is actively engaged with other parties to complete PSI transactions 
without subsequent authentication, she could focus on collecting attributes as a form of 
intelligence gathering using numerous bogus accounts. 
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Fig. 10.  ECC-Based SH protocol in PPIM. 
 
If Mallory is only eavesdropping, she cannot decipher the attributes, and 
therefore does not know IS(Ta, Tb), nor IS (Tb, Ta), but she could become active at end of 
the PSI protocol and to impersonate both Alice/Bob for subsequent communications. 
The SH is designed to eliminate such a possibility by using IS(Ta, Tb) (for Alice) and IS 
(Tb, Ta) (for Bob) as inputs to the SH protocol to prove that (1) they both are affiliated 
with the same group, and (2) they have the same intersection. Furthermore, at 
completion of the SH step, they can derive a common value which can then be used to 
produce a session key for their subsequent private communications. If group 
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membership is not a critical concern, the SH can be used as a “confirmation protocol”, 
where the PSI outcome is directly used as the “credential issued by GA” to prove the 
equality of IS(Ta, Tb) and  IS (Tb, Ta) affirmatively. Neither Bob nor Alice will unveil 
IS(Ta, Tb) or IS (Tb, Ta) to each other if the SH produces a negative outcome. The 
detailed of the interlocked SH protocol was presented in Section IV. B and is omitted 
here. 
Computing cost is an important issue which directly affects consumers’ 
acceptance of new technologies. We will first briefly summarize the computing 
complexity of the propose scheme, and then will present experimental results of our 
prototypes. Knowing that they have much higher computing costs than other operations 
[86], we use the number of the point multiplications T(P) and mappings T(M) to estimate  
the performance of PPIM. For two users both with n attributes, it takes (n + 1) mapping 
operations to transform n attributes to their corresponding elliptic curve points. It takes 
(n + 2) point multiplications to encrypt them. It takes [(n + 1)2 + 1] point 
multiplications and (n + 1) mappings to modify n ciphertexts. It needs (n + 1) point 
multiplications to decrypt the modified ciphertexts to get the matching outcomes. The 
total cost of the PSI protocol is O(PSI) ≈ 2(n + 1)T(M) + [(n + 1)2 + 2n + 4]T(P) ≈ 
O(n)T(M) + O(n2)T(P). The only major computing cost of SH is computing of Tate 
paring, and our secret handshake for the authentication of one credential needs 2 
computations of pairing. The communication cost, or the total message size is 
proportional to number of the input attributes, or O(n). 
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We consider the following attacks in the open networking environment: (1) 
active attacks that aim at compromising the authenticity of a user’s private information, 
e.g. impersonation; (2) passive attacks that aim at compromising confidentiality of a 
user’s private information, e.g. eavesdropping. We also consider two kinds of 
adversaries: outsider adversaries and inside adversaries. An outsider adversary does not 
know any of the roles in matching, nor does it have any knowledge about the user’s 
private information. An inside adversary is a malicious user that participates in the PSI 
and SH protocols with some other user. We claim that our PPIM holds the security 
properties (P1 to P5) given the adversary model and attack model. 
The PPIM solution focuses on preserving privacy for social matching process. 
That is, it is not intended to solve every security problems. Some attacks to our proposed 
system are possible. Here, we discuss some of these possible attacks and corresponding 
solutions. (1) Denial-of-Service attack: in this attack, a malicious user may launch 
arbitrary huge number of matching requests to other users, so that other users’ 
computation and communication resources may be misused, like the effect of any DoS 
attack. A practical solution to this attack is to set a limit on the number of matching 
request from a single user to another one in a time window. (2) Absolute-Matching 
Attack: an attacker A may input all possible values of attributes into another user B’s 
requesting ciphertexts such that user B will always find matching attributes and consider 
A as a matching partner. One of the simple solutions is that our PPIM imposes a limit on 
the number of modified ciphertexts returned by A according to B’s number of encrypted 
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attributes, e.g., the number of encrypted attributes and the number of returned modified 
ciphertexts must be same or their difference is within a small range. 
To demonstrate the utility of the PPIM service, we developed a patient support 
community called “PatientMatch”, using Facebook as the SNS. The objective of the 
PatientMatch prototype is to form a supporting group among qualified constituents 
(patients, social workers, etc), for a particular type of health conditions (chronic illness, 
substance abuse, etc) to simulate the type of services provided in [78], but keep other 
people out of the group. Detail of the evaluation of PPIM is presented in Appendix B. 
B. PRIVACY-PRESERVING CORRELATION OF NETWORK SECURITY ALERTS 
Alert correlation refers to the process of identifying the true nature of an attack 
by discovering common (matched) attacking information from alerts generated from 
security tools deployed at different networks. Most basic alert attributes, e.g., IP 
addresses, packet payloads (which may contain user accounts, pin numbers), etc. are 
considered sensitive information [8][21]. Unrestricted sharing of (local) alerts may lead 
to malicious mining of network vulnerabilities [6][8][88], litigation, or even stealing of 
business secrets. In the mean time, matched alerts should be unveiled to involved parties 
to determine global attack information, but other unmatched local information should be 
protected. With the rapid growth in scales, speed, and sophistication of network attacks, 
there is a pressing need to develop useable tools for collaborative network administrators 
to correlate their local alerts to discover common attacks while protecting their privacy, 
i.e., privacy-preserving alert correlation schemes. 
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The majority of previous privacy-preserving alert correlation schemes 
[6][12][13][14]perform alert correlation using sanitized (e.g., hash, content 
generalization, etc) less sensitive data (e.g., source IPs), after sensitive alert data are 
removed. This approach often misses out the most critical information for recovery of 
developing situations yet is still vulnerable to dictionary attack [7], which is considered 
an important privacy threat for alert correlation [7][22]. Some alert correlation services 
are available for public access [89][90]. In these services, a central server collects alerts 
and publishes correlation results. Again, for privacy protection, users need to first 
remove sensitive information from their alerts before submitting them to the server. 
Moreover, in this architecture the adversary can use the server to launch probe-response 
attack and mapping attack [6][7], in order to identify the defense ability/vulnerability of 
targeted networks.  
Private set intersection (PSI) (e.g., [24][32]), and secure multi-party computation 
(SMC) (e.g.,[41][42]) are two major types of crypto algorithms that allow users to use 
any sensitive data for privacy-preserving alert correlation. Through these algorithms 
users can know either (1) they have the same contents, or (2) they have unmatched 
contents without gaining any other information from other users. Numerous algorithms 
have been proposed for PSI and SMC, yet the cost of most of them is still considered too 
high (e.g., O(n2) crypto operations for PSI [24][32]) to be practical for large scale alert 
correlation applications [23][91]. 
How to guarantee privacy protection and make accurate alert correlation at low 
computing cost remains a major open problem [7][22]. As such, the design criteria of an 
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alert correlation tool should have (1) guaranteed protection of privileged data, (2) 
accurate reflection of attack states from as many types of alert attributes as possible, (3) 
acceptable computing costs, (4)compatible with the distributed administration 
architecture of the Internet, and (5) ease of creating new applications.  
We propose two cryptographic protocols for a privacy-preserving alert 
correlation (PAC) system to meet these five challenges. The first proposed is the linear 
PSI protocol (Protocol II) proposed in Section III. C. It is designed for privacy-
preserving computing of the intersection of two sets of records for formatted attributes, 
i.e., attributes (IP addresses, port numbers, etc.) in unified formats. We will call the 
records that belong to a particular attribute “attribute records”. For instance, Alice may 
want to inquire Bob “Which of these (source) IPs in my alerts also appear in your 
alerts?” Through Protocol II, both Alice and Bob can confirm the set of common IPs, 
and no other information related to the unmatched ones can be inferred from any of the 
exchanged messages. Existing PSI schemes would either use polynomial evaluation 
[24][32], or the bit-by-bit oblivious transfer (OT) [27] to find the intersection. On the 
other hand, Protocol II can perform matching through comparison of encrypted attribute 
records. A distinct feature of Protocol II is its linear computing cost for crypto 
operations (homomorphic encryption/decryption) with respect to the number of input 
records. 
As the first of its kind, we also propose a new protocol (Protocol VI) that 
supports privacy-preserving computing of the longest common sub-string (LCS) of two 
records of a particular string attribute (e.g., captured payloads). The length for any 
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record of a string attribute is bounded but arbitrary. Computing of the LCS of multiple 
suspected payloads can generate common contents (e.g., matched detection signatures of 
malwares) while remove local network information (unmatched contents). In Protocol 
VI, a variable-length string is first split into a set of concatenated, fixed length blocks. 
The LCS of the two strings is privately computed using the combination of Protocol II 
and location protection functions (crypto randomization and ciphertexts shuffling) on 
these blocks.  
Both schemes are immune from passive attacks (e.g., dictionary attack) due to 
the well known elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [45] (design 
criterion 1). Accurate correlation results can be directly obtained for many types of 
attributes (design criterion 2). The proposed protocols have linear crypto computing 
complexity O(n). It takes 1 second (2 minutes) for our scheme to match between two 
sets of 100 (10k) records on a 2GHz Intel Xeon-based computer (design criterion 3). In 
comparison, it took required 213 seconds [23][26] for the original PSI algorithm [24], 
whose crypto computing complexity is (O(n2)), to match between two sets of 100 
records on a 3 GHz Intel Xeon-based computer. To meet the design criteria 4 and 5, at 
the network level PAC is based on a loosely coupled distributed architecture consisting 
of a PAC communicator and multiple PAC clients. Being a pair-wise matching 
architecture, PAC does not suffer from probe-response attacks and mapping attacks of 
the centralized correlation architecture. 
PAC is the first of its kind that directly obtains true state information of attacks 
from the alert correlation process with guaranteed privacy protection against semi-honest 
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adversary. It has among the lowest computing costs for this level of privacy protection. 
No published privacy-preserving alert correlation solution has achieved the same level of 
correlation accuracy, privacy protection, and computing costs simultaneously. 
Protocol II follows the homomorphism based private set matching model initially 
proposed in [24], but it has one order lower of computing complexity, i.e., O(n), for 
crypto operations, than the polynomial evaluation technique in [24], i.e., O(n2). Our 
Protocol VI is the first privacy-preserving LCS computing scheme with guaranteed 
privacy protection against semi-honest adversary. 
PAC is designed for two well-behaved users (e.g., network administrators) to 
find (1) the intersection of two sets of attribute records, (2) the LCS of two records of 
any string attribute. Privacy preservation is guaranteed in PAC, i.e., all unmatched 
elements remain secret. All the records used in correlation process are assumed to be 
genuine, and verification of the authenticity of alert data is beyond the scope of this 
research. PAC is designed to resist passive attacks launched by honest-but-curious (i.e., 
semi-honest) adversary, but it is not designed to defend against active attacks, e.g., 
forging of alert records, traffic interception, etc.  
Matching of alert records across networks can produce useful wide-area attack 
information. For instance, correlation of IP addresses can help discovering attack 
topologies. Matching of source IPs in alerts (on different networks) can help discovery 
of a common attacker. In this case, networks generating these alerts may be targets of a 
same attack. On the other hand, we can detect a common attack victim by matching of 
the destination IP addresses originated from different networks. Alert correlation can 
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also help detection of   attack chains (e.g., stepping-stone attacks), which refer to 
coordinated use of multiple hosts across different networks to hide trails of attacks. 
Traditionally, it often requires extensive coordination of network administrators across 
networks to manually filter and exchange data to capture the stealthy traffic. On the 
other hand, with the help of PAC network administrators can match source and 
destination IPs of detection alerts to discover the adjacent nodes of an attack chain, 
without the concern of unveiling any other unrelated (local) information. Fragment 
information can then be aggregated to reveal the global topology of the attack chain.  
LCS based matching can be used for discovery of common content of raw 
packets, worms/bots signatures already generated by tools (e.g., Autograph [92]) within 
local networks, etc. Computation of the LCS from signatures across two networks gives 
more accurate, more global worms/bots signature by elimination of substrings likely 
related to local information. 
The architecture of a PAC system is illustrated in Fig. 11(a). The PAC 
communicator serves as a community portal for participants to identify correlation 
partners using common tools such as instant messenger, email, posting, etc. Once two 
users agree to correlate their alerts, they can use the communicator to first settle the 
syntax, types, formats, and other information for the alert contents to be correlated. Then, 
all private computing functions are performed on client tools that run on the host 
machines of users.  
The PAC client is consisted of three major modules: an alert parser, a privacy-
preserving matching engine (PPME) and an alert correlator (AC), see Fig. 11(b). The 
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alert parser extracts and format alert records from raw alerts generated from any local 
alerting tools. The PPME takes the attribute records as inputs and interact with other 
PPMEs to match them. Let LA(LB) denote alerts owned by Alice (Bob), generated from 
her(his) local alerting systems. They are fed to the alert parser to extract a set of attribute 
records A = (a1, a2, …, an) (B = (b1, b2, …, bm)). Let C={c1, c2, … ck} denote the 
intersection of A and B. The objective of Protocol II in PPME is for Alice and Bob to 
identify C, but nothing else, provided that A and B are in the same format. Protocol VI in 
PPME is for Alice and Bob to privately compute the LCS of their input strings SA and SB, 
without unveiling any other (unmatched) parts in SB(SA) to each other. The matching 
outcomes are then fed to the alert correlator to report the final correlation results. 
 
local alerting tools
(IDS , IPS, signature generation tools, honeynet, firewall, etc) 
privacy-preserving matching engine
(Scheme I, Scheme II)
 attack patterns
(common attackers/victims, attack 
chains, etc)
 common attack contents
matched attribute records or LCS
alert parser
alert correlator
formatted or string  attribute records
(b)
PAC
Communicator 
PAC client
PAC client
(a)
 
Fig. 11. (a) The PAC system architecture (b) Major modules of a PAC client. 
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The general workflow of PPME for Protocol II is summarized as follows. First, 
the PPME of Alice uses an encryption function E to map hashed attribute records into 
ciphertexts, and sends them to the PPME of Bob. The PPME of Bob uses a modification 
function M to create a new ciphertext by bundling the received ciphertexts with his own 
attribute records, and then returns it back to the PPME of Alice. This way, the PPME of 
Alice can use a decryption function D to compute the matched attribute records of Alice 
and Bob from the modified ciphertexts. For Protocol VI additional steps are required to 
calculate the LCS. The terms E (encryption) and D (decryption) are drawn from the 
naming convention of private set intersection literatures, e.g., [24]. They can be 
conceptualized as a form of public-private key encryption-decryption chain, except that 
we obtain the Yes-No results (i.e., two records are identical or not) at end of the process. 
In this section we present details of Protocol VI in PPME. We note that the 
design of Protocol II is based upon the second private set intersection protocol proposed 
in Section III. C. Protocol VI is designed for Alice and Bob to compute the LCS of 
strings SA and SB, separately owned by them. It is consisted of three phases. In the first 
phase, it is used to discover common short sub-strings. In the second phase, some 
(protected) position information of matched short sub-strings is revealed to each other. 
Finally, longer common sub-strings can be discovered, until the longest common sub-
string is found.  
In the first phase Alice and Bob agree upon a parameter l, so that both SA and SB 
are broken into two sets of l-grams L(SA) and L(SB), respectively. This implies that n-
grams whose lengths shorter than l are not considered. In the second phase, positions of 
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matched l-grams are privately computed for discovery of all possible common sub-
strings, without explicit unveiling of these positions. These positions can be 
compromised under two conditions: (1) multiple unlinked shorter sub-strings of a user 
could be used to infer a longer sub-string of the other user, or (2) vice versa. We 
eliminate these problems by adding randomly generated “faked sub-strings” (or, faked 
ECC points in our design), such that the protected sub-strings cannot be exhaustively 
matched by other unlinked shorter sub-strings or a longer sub-string. A randomization 
function R is responsible for generation of those faked points. In the mean time, the 
randomization should still allow Alice and Bob to discover their adjacent matched l-
grams within a few rounds of interactions. Selection on the number of faked points is 
based on the balance between protection of location information and computing cost. In 
the third phase, Alice (Bob) generates all possible sub-strings based on her (his) 
common, sequenced l-grams. These sub-strings are used for matching by Protocol II to 
discover the longest common sub-string. Next, we introduce more details about the three 
phases, and then formally summarize the scheme.  
In the first phase, Alice and Bob determine a set of matched l-grams L(C) = {c1, 
c2, … cw} between L(SA) and L(SB) using Protocol II. In the second phase Alice (Bob) 
first enumerates all sub-strings, UA = {α1, α2, …,αn’} (UB = {β1, β2, β3, …,βm’}) that can be 
generated by concatenation of some adjacent ck in LA(LB). Any record in UA(UB) is 
removed if it is a sub-string of some other longer string in UA(UB). Next, ∀ αi∈ {α1, 
α2, …,αn’}, Alice generates l-grams L(αi) = {ai1, ai2, …}. The set of all the l-grams 
generated based on UA is denoted as L(UA) = {L(α1), L(α2), …, L(αn’)}. For each L(αi) = 
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{ai1, ai2, …} ∈ L(UA), Alice invokes E of Protocol II to get E(L(αi)) = {E(ai1), E (ai2), …}. 
Then ∀ E(L(αi)) ∈ {E(L(α1)), E(L(α2)), …, E(L(αn’))}, Alice generates randomized-
shuffled ciphertext R(E(L(αi)), by inserting random ECC points to E(L(αi)) and then 
shuffling their order.  
The set of randomized-shuffled ciphertexts is denoted as R(E(L(UA)) = 
{R(E(L(α1))), R(E(L(α2))), … , R(E(L(αn’)))}. Then Alice transforms it into R(E(L(UA))’ 
by inserting an infinite point O of E between every two entries in R(E(L(UA)) (i.e., use O 
as a symbol to separate every two entries in R(E(L(UA))). Following a similar procedure, 
Bob also generates L(UB) = { L(β1), L(β2), …, L(βm’)} and R(E(L(UB))’. Alice and Bob 
then exchange R(E(L(UA))’ and R(E(L(UB))’.  
With L(UA) and R(E(L(UB))’ as its inputs, Alice generates M{L(UA), R(E(L(UB))’} 
by the modification function M of Protocol II. In the process, the randomization and 
shuffling and insertion functions mentioned above are also employed. Bob also 
generates M{L(UB), R(E(L(UA))’} following a similar procedure. Alice and Bob then 
exchange their modified ciphertexts M{L(UA), R(E(L(UB))’} and M{L(UB), R(E(L(UA))’}. 
Then Alice (Bob) can use D to find L(UC), which denotes the common l-grams between 
L(UA) and L(UB) with adjacent positions in UA(UB). In the last phase, Alice (Bob) 
generates all possible sub-strings based on L(UC) and UA(UB). These sub-strings are used 
for matching by Protocol II to discover the longest common sub-string.   
During execution of E and M, Alice/Bob can protect location information of 
ciphertexts or modified-ciphertexts by insertion of random ECC points generated by R. 
For example, in Protocol II when Alice encrypts A to get E
 
(A) = [E(a0), E(a1),…, E(an)], 
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she could call R to generate additional 2s points and attach them with the real ciphertexts, 
i.e., R(E
 
(A)) = [E(a0), E(a1),…, E(an), E(a’0), E(a’1),…, E(a’s)], where s is a chosen large 
integer, ∀ i ∈ [0, s], E(a’i) = [E(a’i)f, E(a’i)b]= (rAQ, Pi), Pi is a randomly generated 
faked point. R guarantees that Bob cannot tell whether or not a point represents a real 
attribute record, or a faked point. The detail of Protocol VI is introduced as follows. 
Protocol VI. Privacy-Preserving LCS Computation 
Input: Alice’s string SA, Bob’s string SB, shortest sub-string length l, and all other 
security parameters presented in Protocol II 
Output: the longest common sub-string LCS between SA and SB 
(1) Alice: generate L(SA) from SA 
(2) Bob: generate L(SB) from SB 
(3) Alice ↔ Bob: Alice and Bob implement Protocol II to find L(C) = {c1, c2, … cw}, 
the matched records of L(SA) and L(SB) 
(4) Phase 2 
(5) Alice: generate plaintexts L(UA) and ciphertexts R(E(L(UA))’ by taking the 
following steps: generate sub-strings UA = {α1, α2, …,αn’}, ∀ αi ∈ UA, αi is 
generated from the concatenation of some ca0, ca1, …, ∈ L(C), where ca0, ca1, … 
are adjacent in SA. ∀ αi ∈ UA, αi  is removed from UA if there is another αi’ ∈ 
UA ,αi  ιs a substring of αi’ for αi= α1 to αi= αn’, generate l-grams L(αi)= {ai1, 
ai2, …}, the set of all the l-grams of UA is denoted by L(UA) = {L(αi), L(α2), …, 
L(αn’)}. For L(αi)= L(α1) to L(αi)= L(αn’)’ suppose L(αi) = ai1, ai2,…, , encrypt 
ai1, ai2,… to generate E (ai1), E (ai2),… to get E(L(αi)) = {E (ai1), E (ai2)…}. For 
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E(L(αi)) = E(L(α1)) to E(L(αi)) = E(L(αn’)), call R to add random points into 
E(L(αi)) and then shuffle the order of entries in E(L(αi)), the randomized-
shuffled ciphertexts is denoted by R(E(L(αi)). Generate R(E(L(UA)) = 
{R(E(L(α1)), R(E(L(α2)), … , R(E(L(αn’))} and transform it into R(E(L(UA))’ by 
inserting an infinite ECC point O between every two entries in R(E(L(UA))   
(6) Bob: generate L(UB) and R(E(L(UB))’ following the same steps as Alice 
(7) Alice ↔ Bob: exchange R(E(L(UA))’ and R(E(L(UB))’    
(8) Alice: compute M(L(UA), R(E(L(UB))’), invoke R and shuffling and insertion 
function during the modification process, send M(L(UA), R(E(L(UB))’) to Bob  
(9) Bob: compute M(L(UB), R(E(L(UA))’) and send it to Alice following the same 
procedures 
(10) Alice: compute D(M(L(UA), R(E(L(UB))’)), discover all matched l-grams L(UC) = 
{c0’, c1’, …} and record possible position information, i.e., for any ci, ci’∈ L(UC), 
(a) ci, ci’∈ L(αi) & ci, ci’∈ R(E(L(βj)), where L(αi) ∈ L(UA) and R(E(L(βj)) ∈ 
R(E(L(UB))’; (b) ci, ci’ have adjacent positions in αi 
(11) Bob: discover matched l-grams using a similar confirmation test 
(12) Phase 3 
(13) Alice: generate possible sub-strings based on the common, sequenced l-grams in 
L(UC), execute Protocol II with Bob to find the matched sub-string with the 
longest length  
(14) Bob: find the matched sub-string with the longest length following the same 
procedures 
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The crypto computing complexity of Protocol VI is that of Protocol II, plus the 
additional costs required for randomization and shuffling. Both the parameter l and the 
length of the LCS are important parameters that affect the running time of Protocol VI. 
For example, if two input strings have no LCS, then only Phase 1 will need to be run, i.e., 
only one round of matching between two sets of l-grams is required. On the other hand, 
when two input string have some identical substrings, it is necessary to devise a 
proportional number of steps for shuffling and randomization (faked points). 
In this section we present the proof of the security properties for both schemes. 
In our design we consider passive attacks that aim at compromising confidentiality of 
sensitive information by analyzing transmitted messages, e.g., dictionary attack. We also 
consider both outside adversary and inside adversary: an outside adversary does not 
participate in the matching process and knows nothing, an inside adversary participates 
in a matching process who may have some matched records with the targeted victim and 
try to discover other unmatched records owned by the victim.  
Based on the adversary model and attack model introduced above, Protocol II 
holds Private Set Intersection and Record Confidentiality, Protocol VI holds String 
Confidentiality and Partial Sub-String Confidentiality. (1) Record Confidentiality: either 
an outside or inside polynomial-time adversary cannot learn what attribute records a peer 
owns or what matching results two peers obtained by launching any passive attack, if 
this adversary does not own the same records. Suppose Alice has a set of records A. If ai 
∈ A and Bob does not have ai, Bob cannot learn ai by launching any passive attack. This 
property holds since in Protocol II large random numbers are used to multiply records to 
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generate encrypted records and they are then associated with a fixed ECC point, e.g., 
(rA1ai + rA2)QA. We claim that record ai cannot be deduced from (rA1ai + rA2)QA by any 
passive attack because rA1 and rA2 are large enough to guarantee the ECDLP. (2) Private 
Set Intersection: matching peers only discover matched records in the intersection set of 
their inputs. This property is guaranteed by our matching scheme. Suppose Alice has set 
A and Bob has set B. They did matching process with each other and found their 
intersection SIAB. If record ai ∈ A and ai ∉ SIAB, Bob cannot learn ai by launching any 
passive attacks and vice versa. The property holds also because all records are encrypted 
in a format that guarantees the ECDLP and the detailed analysis is omitted here. 
Since Protocol VI is built upon Protocol II, outsiders cannot compromise a user’s 
privacy by eavesdropping transmitted messages, i.e., String Confidentiality is guaranteed. 
But for malicious insiders, Protocol VI only holds partial confidentiality, named as 
Partial Sub-String Confidentiality. (3) String Confidentiality: an outside adversary 
cannot learn what input string a peer owns or what results (the longest common sub-
string) two peers obtain. Based on the hardness of ECDLP, any polynomial-time outside 
adversary, cannot compromise string confidentiality without compromising the string 
owners. In Protocol VI input strings are processed as l-grams, e.g., L(i)= {ai1, ai2, …}. 
All these l-grams are matched and transmitted in encrypted format by using Protocol II 
as the building block. So if Record Confidentiality holds in Protocol II, String 
Confidentiality also holds for the same reason. (4) Partial Sub-String Confidentiality: an 
inside adversary cannot learn what sub-strings a peer owns if the insider does not have 
the same sub-strings. Depending on the randomization function R, the adversary may 
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know what sub-string a peer possibly has if he owns the l-grams that can comprise the 
substring. That is, if the matched l-grams comprise same sub-strings on both the user’s 
and adversary’s side, the adversary will learn this fact; otherwise, the adversary will only 
know that the user might have the sub-string due to the randomly inserted faked points 
from R. For example, if Alice calls R to add faked points into E(A), she gets R(E
 
(Ai)) = 
[E(a1), E(a2),…, E(an), E(a’1), E(a’2),…, E(a’s)]. Here we assume that each record in A 
represents a l-gram. Since each E(a’i) = [E(a’i)f, E(a’i)b]= (rAQ, Pi) represents a faked 
encrypted l-gram, where Pi is a randomly generated faked point, even if the first n real l-
grams are matched, the adversary only has a small probability to discover the 
corresponding sub-string by combining them in right sequence from the whole (s + n) l-
grams. 
A prototype of PAC has been implemented and evaluated it using real alerts from 
IDS tools such as Snort, worm signature generation tools such as Autograph [92], and 
network traces collected from a real-world honeynet as its inputs. We used PAC to 
correlate the alerts for novel applications such as privacy preserving discovery of global 
attacks, common victims, attack chains, and generation of common malware (e.g., 
worms/bots) signatures. The software prototype is available at 
http://creat.tamu.edu/alertcorrelation/. More detail of the evaluation of PAC is presented 
in Appendix C. 
The related work is in three different areas: privacy-preserving alert correlation, 
alert correlation/aggregation and related cryptographic schemes.  
101 
Privacy-Preserving Alert Correlation: One of the first privacy-preserving alert 
sharing techniques was proposed in [6], which was based on a set of sanitization 
techniques to hash external IP addresses for matching. It implemented keyed hash 
functions to encrypt internal IP address and removed other sensitive parts of alerts, e.g., 
captured and infected data, for privacy protection. The simple and efficient technique 
supported a few correlation functions. It was vulnerable to dictionary attack. Hash-based 
sanitization technique was also implemented in [12] to achieve privacy-preserving 
collaborative intrusion detection based on a P2P networking model. N-gram signature 
and Bloom filter n-gram signature [13] were proposed for payload-based correlation, 
which also only supported limited correlation utilities. Another sanitization technique 
[14] was proposed to generalize sensitive parts of alerts to high-level abstraction, e.g., 
uncertainty, to be incorporated into the data while retaining partial semantics. The 
approach was applied to IP addresses and time stamps to discover possible causal 
relations between attacks. It achieved correlation results on other parts of alerts besides 
IP addresses, with moderate security support. A semi-centralized architecture was 
proposed in [23], in which a proxy blinded user inputs and a server identified the blinded 
keywords by some evaluation function. A survey of previous attempts at privacy-
preserving log sharing techniques was presented in [8], e.g., prefix-preserving IP 
pseudonymizer [93], pseudonym technique [94], packet anonymizer [95] and secure 
auditing technique [96]. Currently there are some real Internet log and data collection 
centers such as the Internet Storm Center (ISC) [89] and DShield.org [90]. Most of them 
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are focused on providing centralized applications with good performance, and privacy 
protection is not their primary concern.  
 Alert Correlation /Aggregation: Many techniques have been proposed for 
plaintext alert correlation to discover more attack information. A formal data model was 
proposed IDS alert correlation in [97]. A decision-theoretic alert fusion technique [98] 
was proposed to improve the performance of combination of diverse intrusion detectors. 
Another approach [99] was presented to construct attack scenarios by correlating alerts 
based on the prerequisites and consequences of intrusions. In [100] a tool was proposed 
to perform real-time alert verification. Another alert aggregation and correlation 
algorithm [101] was presented to discover a more condensed view of alerts. All these 
alert correlation techniques require matching of certain (plaintext) attributes, and our 
technique can be viewed as a supporting tool when privacy protection is a major concern 
for distributed alert collaborators.  
 Related cryptographic schemes: Most of the related have been discussed in 
Section III. The main reason that there have not been any practical privacy-preserving 
alert correlation tools is because that the high computational complexity of most 
previous PSI or SMC protocols are major hurdles for their practical use in correlation of 
large volume of inputs [23][91]. 
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VII. SUMMARY 
The objective of this research work is to develop a general framework for design 
of efficient and secure privacy-preserving element matching and credential 
authentication protocols, and implement the protocols on various Internet applications 
with privacy protection requirement. While most existing cryptographic 
protocols/algorithms face challenges of poor  efficiency, high computing costs, and 
inadequate security protections for different kinds of critical Internet application with 
high security and performance requirement, we proposed two private set intersection 
(PSI) protocols with linear computing and communication costs, an unlinkable secret 
handshake (SH) protocol with reusable credential and least communication cost, and 
interlocked protocols with new security properties. The proposed protocols were also 
implemented to design a privacy-preserving inquiry matching system for online social 
applications and a privacy-preserving alert correlation system for collaboration of 
different sources of network alerts. 
A general framework was presented to illustrate the mathematical basis under 
privacy-preserving element matching and credential authentication protocols. A 
homomorphic randomization function was proposed to meet the conflicting goals: 
matched (verified) elements (credentials) are computed through homomorphism, while 
unmatched (unverified) elements (credentials) are protected through randomization. 
Based on the function we presented common requirement between PSI and SH protocols, 
and the three common phases of PSI and SH protocols: Protocol Initialization phase, 
Secret Matching phase and Result Computing phase. In addition, the general attack 
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model and adversary model for both PSI and SH protocols were introduced in this 
dissertation.  
PSI protocols are used for privacy-preserving element matching. The existing 
PSI solutions have O(n2) or O(nL) computing cost, where n is the number of elements 
and L is the average bit length of an element. Based on the general framework we 
proposed two new PSI protocols with linear computing cost O(n). The first protocol uses 
full homomorphic randomization function as the cryptographic basis, and achieves 
element confidentiality and private set intersection in honest-but-curious adversary 
model with linear computing cost. The second protocol uses partial homomorphic 
randomization function as the cryptographic basis. Besides element confidentiality and 
private set intersection, the second protocol is also more secure against malicious attacks 
like falsification. 
SH protocols are used for privacy-preserving credential authentication. The 
existing SH solutions either requires a large number of pairs of single-use credentials 
and pseudonyms or 6 bilinear mapping operations to achieve unlinkability, which is one 
of the most important security properties of SH protocols. Based on the general 
framework we proposed a new SH protocol that achieves unlinkability with a reusable 
pair of credential and pseudonym. Our solution only requires 2 bilinear mapping 
operations. In our design a party directly chooses random numbers and associates them 
with his pseudonym to minimize the correlation between his credentials and 
pseudonyms. 
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Based on the proposed framework we proposed to interlock PSI protocols and 
SH protocols to design two protocols with new security properties. In the first protocol a 
PSI protocol is executed first and then the matched elements are associated with the 
credentials in a following SH protocol. The first interlocked protocol guarantees 
authenticity on matched elements. In the second protocol a SH protocol is executed first 
and then the pairwise session key and verified credentials are utilized in a following PSI 
protocol. The second interlocked protocol guarantees detection resistance and 
impersonation attack resistance on matching elements. 
We implemented the proposed PSI and SH protocols to provide privacy-
preserving inquiry matching service (PPIM) for social networking applications and 
privacy-preserving correlation service (PAC) of network security alerts. In PPIM a 
system based on an end-user privacy control model is built, in which online social 
service consumers first use non-privileged information to discover potential candidates 
and then engage in PPIM transactions with the candidates to exchange encrypted 
inquiries. The proposed PSI protocol is called in PPIM for matching of (encrypted) 
inquires and the proposed SH protocol is called in PPIM for verification of group 
memberships (credentials). In the end only the owner and her peer with matched 
inquiries and group memberships can know the real transaction contents, but not any 
other users, including our PPIM server. In PAC a system is built to correlate network 
security alerts between semi-honest users. Two different protocols based on the 
homomorphism of the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) are implemented for PAC. The 
first protocol is the proposed partial homomorphism based PSI protocol, which is 
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implemented for privacy-preserving matching of alerts with known formats, e.g., IP 
addresses, port numbers, etc. Expanding from the matching protocol, the second 
protocol is designed for privacy-preserving computation of the longest common sub-
string (LCS) between two input strings, which is used for generating common contents 
of captured malware/intrusion payloads.  
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APPENDIX A  
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES 
Group  
Let {0, 1} denote the set of individual bits and let {0, 1}* denote the set of all bit 
strings. N = {0, 1, 2, …} is the set of all natural numbers. κ ∈ N, 1κ and {0, 1}κ denotes 
the bit string of κ ones and the set of bit strings of length κ, respectively. When a and b 
are strings, then |a| refers to the length of the string a and a||b indicates the 
concatenation of a and b. In this proposal “group” and “field” refer to the group and field 
defined in number theory. Abelian groups and finite fields are two important algebraic 
structures in modern cryptography. They are widely used in real world applications 
because they provide the basic elements and operations for cryptographic schemes. A 
group is thought as a set of objects with an operation between two elements in this set. It 
can be described by mathematical language as follows [102]:  
Definition A. I: a group (G, ◊) is a set G together with an operation ◊ which satisfies the 
following conditions: For all a, b ∈ G, a ◊ b ∈ G. For all a, b, c ∈ G, a ◊ (b ◊ c)=(a ◊ b) 
◊ c.There exists a unique element d ∈ G, for all a ∈ G, a ◊ d = d ◊ a = a. This element d 
is called the identity element. For all a ∈ G, there exists a-1 such that a ◊ a-1 = d  
Public Key Cryptography  
Digital signatures are one of the most important cryptographic tools in modern 
cryptography. In Public Key Cryptography (PKC), every user has two keys: One is the 
public key which is published to everyone, and the other is the secret (or private) key 
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which is kept secret by the corresponding owner. In a traditional PKC, the key pair is 
generated by users or by a key generator called Certificate Authority (CA). In identity-
based PKC (ID-PKC), the key pair is generated by a key generator called Trusted 
Authority (TA). It is worthy of noting that their roles are different. When the key pairs 
are generated by users, the CA does not know the users’ secret key and just issues the 
certificate with the binding of identities and public keys. The TA checks that applicants 
have claimed identity and then issues the corresponding secret key. Thus ID-PKC has a 
key escrow facility. Whether this facility is useful or not depends on the particular 
applications. Both PKC and ID-PKC use the difficulty of the mathematical problems, 
such as integer factoring problems and discrete logarithm problems, to guarantee that no 
one is able to recover the secret (private) key from the public key. The difference 
between PKC and ID-PKC is that the public key is random in PKC, while the public key 
in ID-PKC is specified before generating the private/secret key.  
Random Oracle Model and Standard Model 
The hash function is a very useful tool in modern cryptography because it has the 
property of collision-resistant. Collision-resistant means that it is impossible for anyone 
to find two different messages providing the same hash value. The hash function was 
originally designed to be used in digital signature schemes for signing long messages by 
reducing the size of the signatures without comprising the integrity of the message. In 
order to obtain related arguments in the security proof of cryptographic schemes, some 
cryptographers [104][105][106][107] have suggested that hash functions should be seen 
as random functions. Therefore, a new model, the random oracle model (ROM), has 
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been introduced into the security proofs of cryptographic schemes. If one expects to 
prove the security of a cryptographic scheme where hash functions are used, then these 
hash functions are viewed as random oracles. This often makes it easy and simple to 
prove the security of cryptographic schemes. The random oracles will return a truly 
random value for each new query from a challenger. If a new query is the same as a 
previous query, the random oracle will return an identical answer. This theoretical model 
can help cryptographers verify whether the design of a cryptographic scheme is secure or 
not. However, the random oracle model is only an imaginary model in theory. There 
does not exist a true random oracle in the real world. In real world applications, hash 
functions such as SHA-224 [108] play the role of random oracles. Since the concept of 
the random oracle model was introduced into the community, researchers have used it to 
provide the security proof for numerous cryptographic schemes. Although many 
cryptographic schemes have been proven in the random oracle model, some researchers 
doubted the reliability of this model. As what has been discussed in previous section, 
hash functions are usually treated as random imaginary functions when proving the 
security of the cryptographic schemes in the random oracle model. Recently, Canetti, 
Goldreich and Halevi [109] investigated the reliability of the random oracle and 
presented some useful results. They showed that there were some examples of 
cryptographic schemes which are secured under the random oracle model but not in real 
applications. Therefore, constructing cryptographic schemes without using random 
oracles, namely in the standard model, has become an active research area. Encryption 
schemes and signature schemes that do not use random oracles have been proposed 
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[110][111]. Their security has been proven in the standard model. It is noted that, 
although the authors of [109] have shown the weakness of the random oracle model, 
they did not agree that the random oracle model was of no use in proving the security of 
the cryptographic schemes. Until now, there has been no explicit conclusion that 
cryptographic schemes should not use random oracles. Therefore, new cryptographic 
schemes with random oracles whose security is also proven in the random oracle model 
are still being constructed. 
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was proposed by Koblitz [43] and Miller [44]. 
They independently suggested the use of elliptic curve groups in Public Key 
Cryptography. Finite abelian groups are fundamental to Public Key Cryptography. 
Elliptic curves over finite fields offer a large number of such finite abelian groups. In the 
past twenty years, researchers have paid much attention to ECC and developed many 
important cryptographic schemes. Compared with cryptosystems based on RSA or DLP, 
ECC has several advantages. One of them is that ECC is able to provide reliable security 
with shorter key lengths than other cryptosystems (more). Next, we review the definition 
of elliptic curves over finite fields. Let K = Fp be a finite field. Suppose E(K) is an 
elliptic curve E over a field K, it is defined as the set of points (x, y) with x, y ∈ K that 
satisfy the Weierstrass equation. E(K) also includes an extra point O called point at 
infinity which is usually denoted by O =(x, 1). The number of points on E(K) is called 
the order of E(K) which is denoted by E(K) or # E. When K = Fp for a large prime p ≥ 5, 
the Weierstrass equation shown in Equation 2.1 is simplified into the following equation 
120 
y2 = x3 + a4x + a6. An elliptic curve is the set of points (x,y) which satisfy the equation 
y2 = x3 + a·x + b, where x, y, a, and b are over same finite field, e.g. Fp. If 4·a3 + 27·b2 
≠ 0 (i.e. x3 + a·x + b contains no repeated factors), then points on an elliptic curve can 
be used to form an additive group, usually written as E(Fp). Addition and doubling are 
the two operations defined on a group of curve points. They are further used to compute 
point multiplication, which is the basis of any elliptic curve cryptographic schemes: 
given an integer k, computation of kP is called point multiplication. It was based on a 
famous hard problem, i.e., Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Given points P, 
Q ∈ E(Fq) (E(Fq) is the additive group formed by the points on an elliptic curve), finding 
an integer k ∈ Fq such that k·P = Q is called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem.  
Definition A. II: for an elliptic curve E over a finite field K, where P, Q are two points 
on E(K), it is difficult to determine λ ∈ Z such that Q =λP 
Pairing-Based Cryptography 
Menezes, Okamoto and Vanstone [112] proposed an efficient attack method for 
supersingular elliptic curves called MOV attack. That is, an ECDLP on supersingular 
elliptic curves can be reduced to a much easier DLP in a finite field by using bilinear 
pairings, such as Weil pairing [112] or Tate pairing [113]. Therefore, such a 
supersingular elliptic curve was seen as weak and to be avoided when selecting elliptic 
curve parameters. Later the idea was implemented to generate pairing-based 
cryptosystem [114]. Let q be a positive integer. G1 and G2 are two additive groups of 
order q where DLP is difficult. G3 is a multiplicative group of order q. A bilinear pairing 
e can be defined as e : G1 × G2 → G3  
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Currently, the bilinear pairings used in most existing cryptographic schemes are 
derived from Tate pairings or Weil pairings, which can be implemented on a 
supersingular elliptic curve or a suitable non-supersingular elliptic curve. G1 and G2 are 
usually regarded as two Abelian groups constructed by elliptic curves over finite fields. 
Let k be an integer larger than 1. In the following description, k is either a finite field Fpk 
or a subfield of Fpk, and k is defined as an embedding degree or security parameter. The 
bilinear pairings in ECC are usually thought of as functions which map two elliptic 
curve points to an element of a multiplicative group. Let O denote the identity element 
of G1 or G2 and let 1 denote the identity element of G3. The bilinear pairings have the 
following properties:  
Definition A. III Bilinearity: For any P1, P2 ∈ G1, Q1, Q2 ∈ G2, e(P1 + P2; Q1)= e(P1; 
Q1) e(P2; Q1) and e(P1; Q1 + Q2)= e(P1; Q1) e(P1; Q2). 
Definition A. IV Non-degeneracy: For all P ∈ G1 except O, there is some point Q ∈ G2 
such that e(P, Q) = 1. In the same way, for all Q ∈ G2 except O, there is some point P ∈ 
G1 such that e(P, Q) ≠ 1.  
Suppose G1 denotes an additive cyclic group of prime order q. G2 denotes a 
multiplicative cyclic group of order q. G1 and G2 are selected in such a way that the 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [45] is hard in both of them. Let G be an additive 
group. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) in G is defined by 
Definition A. V: Given P , aP and bP ∈ G for a, b ∈ Z*p, compute abP. 
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) [115] in G is defined by  
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Definition A. VI: Given P , aP , bP and cP ∈ G for a, b and c ∈ Z*p, decide whether c ≡ 
ab (mod p) or not. If true, (P , aP , bP , cP ) is called a Diffie Hellman tuple. 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) [115] Assumption is defined by 
Definition A. VII: given P, aP, bP, cP for random a, b, c ∈ Z*q and P ∈ G1, it is not 
possible to compute e(P, P)a⋅b⋅c with a non-negligible probability, i.e., it is hard to 
compute e(P, P)a⋅b⋅c. 
A group G with prime order is called Gap-Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group if 
DDHP can be solved in polynomial time while no known polynomial time algorithm can 
solve CDHP with non-negligible advantage in polynomial time. An additive group G 
constructed on an elliptic curve over finite fields is such a GDH group due to the 
existence of the bilinear pairings. MOV attack [112] based on Weil pairing and FR 
attack [113] based on Tate pairing make it possible to solve DDH in G, whereas there is 
no known polynomial time algorithms for CDHP in G. CDHP and DDHP are the 
fundamentals of pairing-based cryptosystems. These mathematical assumptions will be 
used widely in advanced pairing-based cryptographic schemes. 
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APPENDIX B 
EVALUATION OF PPIM 
To demonstrate the utility of the PPIM service, we developed a patient support 
community called “PatientMatch”, using Facebook as the SNS. The objective of the 
PatientMatch prototype is to form a supporting group among qualified constituents 
(patients, social workers, etc), for a particular type of health conditions (chronic illness, 
substance abuse, etc) to simulate the type of services provided in [78], but keep other 
people out of the group. Fig. 12 (a) shows a snapshot of the user interface of the 
PatientMatch client tool, which only included the PSI functions. We have also 
implemented the SH protocol, but it was only used for the running time evaluation.  
Facebook platform assigns API Key and Application Secret for running each 
application. Facebook uses callback URL to forward the request to users between 
applications web pages. We implemented PatientMatch as a desktop application in order 
to fully support the crypto-related computations. Otherwise, the web-based application 
would be subject to the restriction of the javascript.  
The PPIM server is implemented as a web service using standard HTTP port to 
exchange XML messages with PPIM client, based on the Simple Object Access   
Protocol (SOAP).  The software architecture for the PPIM server and its client tool is 
shown in Fig. 12 (b). A prototype of the PPIM server and our Patient- Match sample 
desktop application can be accessed through 
“http://apps.facebook.com/secretsharesearch”. The PPIM client is compiled into a DLL 
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with an exposed API so that it can be used as a plug-in by existing SNS applications. 
Following an asynchronous messaging model, the PPIM server uses a (MySql) database 
to buffer any unprocessed (ciphertext) messages between principals. The PPIM client 
provides all the cryptographic functions (encryption, injection and modification of 
ciphertexts, and decryption) and PPIM related networking functions.  
 
 
 
Fig. 12. The PatientMatch prototype. (a) The client tool (b) PPIM architecture. 
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In the application, Alice can try to locate peers based on the health conditions 
(left up corner of the GUI), discover potential matching candidates from SNS (next to 
the attribute selection on GUI), encrypt the attributes (middle left box of GUI), and 
upload the inquiries to PPIM server. Then, she needs to wait for matching candidates to 
respond on the submitted inquiries. On the right upper corner, two boxes with green 
labels represent matching invitations and their inquiries stored on the PPIM server. Alice 
can download inquiries of these invitations, and modify these inquiries using the 
modification function F. Then, she can upload them back to the PPIM server. On the 
right lower corner, Alice can download all her submitted inquires that have been 
modified by her matching candidates. She can then choose from the list of downloaded, 
modified inquiries to perform the matching to get the final outcomes.  
We used MIRACL [86] as the crypto library.  We chose G1 as an additive group 
of points on ς: y2 = x3 + x, with prime order q = 2159 + 217 + 1. All our parameters 
obtained from [86] deliver protection strength comparable to 1024-bit RSA. We chose e 
as Tate pairing [85], and the SHA-1 [87] as H2.  
We tested the running time of the PPIM software on different machines. First, we 
conducted a few experiments on an Intel Pentium-4 2-GHz processor with 256-Mbyte 
RAM and Windows XP. First we test the running time of SH. Given that other 
operations in SH like hash function takes less than 1 ms, we used the computation of 
Tate pairing [85] to represent the SH processing time. Basically two pairing 
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computations that represent one successful SH execution need approximately 130 ms, 
which is efficient enough for practical use.  
In the second experiment we measured the running time of one PSI transaction 
executed between two PPIM client tools for Alice and Bob on the same machine to 
minimize the communication delays. All messages are essentially encrypted elliptic 
curve points, one point per attribute, and the message size for each point is roughly 1K 
bytes. All the reported results are based the average of 100 runs of each experiment. The 
running times, including the (very small) communication delays, for one round of PSI 
matching for the 2n attributes between two users, where n = 10, 100, 1000, and 10000,  
is given in Table 7. When the client tool of Alice receives the modified attributes from 
that of Bob, it first fills up a comparison table after each modified attribute is multiple by 
its private key PRIa. Then, each entry in this table is directly compared against every 
entry of the inquiry sent by Bob. When n = 10 and 100, the total matching time is not 
increased much because the majority of time was spent on creation of the comparison 
table. When the number of attributes is large enough, the table creation time becomes 
less significant, and the comparison time   becomes increasingly dominating. This leads 
to fairly linear increase of the overall PSI running time when n increased from 10 to 10k. 
 
Table 7. Average running time of the ECC-based PSI protocol. 
Number of Attributes 20 200 2k 20k 
Time (sec) 6.266 7.750 22.953 175.436 
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Our experiments show that the computing cost is determined by the number of 
attributes that need to be matched. That is, when Alice
 
uses 10 attributes to perform 
matching with other 1000 users, each of them also has 10 attributes; the total computing 
time is about the same as that Alice
 
performs matching with one user who has 10k 
attributes for matching.  In another setting, we fixed the number of attributes
 
 at n =10 
for Alice, and  the number of attributes for  Bob
 
 at m, and the result is given in Table 8, 
with very similar  performance characteristics as the first experiment: when n is small 
(large), the comparison table creation (matching) time dominates the other. 
 
Table 8. Average running time of the PSI protocol. 
(n, m) 10:10 10 : 100 10 : 1k 10 : 10k 
Time (sec) 6.266 6.985 14.594 90.891 
 
We also measured the matching time in a 100M bps local network environment, 
in which two PPIM clients run on two different machines MA and MB, and the PPIM 
server runs on machine MC. Each request is fixed at the size of 10 attributes, and the 
running time for different parts of operations is itemed below. MA generates the specified 
number of requests NR in step S1. It signals MC about the new request in step S2. MC 
informs of MB about the new matching request, in step S3. Then, the request is sent from 
MA, through MC, to MB, in step S4. MB modifies the received inquiry in step S5, and then 
directly returns it to MC. MC first notifies MA of the completion of the modification in 
step S6, and then sends it the modified request. The cost of sending the modified inquiry 
from MB, through MC, to MA, excluding that of S6, is counted as step S7. Finally, MA 
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performs the final matching step in step S8. The running time measurements of S1 to S8 
are summarized in Table 9. The results suggest that the average cost TA for handling one 
request is about a fraction of a second (0.12-0.13 sec), and the PPIM server is not 
considered a performance bottleneck. 
 
Table 9 Running time (rounded) between three machines (unit: sec). 
NR S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 TA 
1 0.034 0.034 0.003 0.04 0.003 0.006 0.04 0.003 0.17 
10 0.34 0.05 0.005 0.4 0.02 0.007 0.4 0.024 0.12 
100 3.4 0.05 0.02 4.9 0.2 0.008 4.3 0.24 0.13 
1k 34.5 0.05 0.1 45 2 0.045 44.3 2.45 0.128 
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APPENDIX C 
EVALUATION OF PAC 
We have implemented PAC client tool using the crypto library of MIRACL [86] 
to test functionality and computing costs of the proposed algorithms. We chose G1 as an 
additive group of points on E: y2 = x3 + x, with the prime order q = 2159 + 217 + 1, and 
SHA-1 is selected [87] as H1.  We used the PAC client tool to correlate alerts generated 
from Snort, Autograph and honeynet traces for functionality testing. 
The primary computing costs include the time required to perform matching, and 
the bandwidth for transmission of messages. We installed two copies of PAC client tools 
on two locally connected PC machines PC1 and PC2, (Intel(R) Xeon(TM) CPU 
2.40GHz, RAM 2.00GB and Intel Core 2 Duo CPU 2.00GHz, 2.00GB RAM). For 
computing cost testing, we increased the number of attribute records (IP addresses 
extracted from a real honeynet trace) from 100 to 10000 on each machine to perform 
matching using Protocol II. Each experiment is repeated for twenty times to get the 
average computing costs, and the results are presented in Fig. 13 (a). The computing cost 
grows linearly with the number of attribute records: about one second for matching of 
100 attribute records and less than 120 seconds for matching of 10000 attribute records 
for both two machines. The bandwidth requirement also grows linearly with the number 
of attribute records (see Fig. 13 (b)) based on the measurements made by Wireshark on 
PC1 [103]. 
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We performed two experiments to derive the LCS between two inputs strings, 
whose lengths were set at 100 and 1000, respectively. For each input set, we further 
adjusted lengths of LCS, denoted as |LCS|, from 0 (matching of l-grams alone), to half 
input length, and to the full input length. We chose l = 5 for all experiments. The 
running times for these experiments are given in Table 10. The major costs of Protocol 
VI are associated with protection of locations of matched l-grams, i.e., randomization 
and shuffling, and the matching caused by the inserted faked points. We can see that the 
computing cost is linear to the input string length when the percentage p is fixed. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. (a) Processing time, and (b) Bandwidth for Protocol II of PAC. 
131 
Table 10. Average running time of the PPLCS protocol. 
Input lengths:  100 Time (s) Input lengths:  100 Time (s) 
LCS length = 0 1.02 LCS length = 0 10.11 
LCS length = 50 12.46 LCS length = 500 127.88 
LCS length = 100 22.05 LCS length = 1000 221.94 
 
We tested discovery of attack patterns using a honeynet packet trace captured in 
a ten-day period in 2007. This original trace contains successful host infections from 
external attackers, and a short period of infection propagation. To simulate correlation of 
source-destination IP addresses across two different networks, we divided the original 
trace by time and then by IP address to generate 4 traces. Trace 1(2) covers the first 
(second) period of 5 days that contains 131k (21k) packets for 6177(5246) distinct IP 
addresses. Trace 3(4) covers subnet I (II) for the 10 day period, and it contains 69k (83k) 
packets for 5215 (6275) distinct IP addresses. For common attacker/victim correlation, 
we extracted IP addresses from each trace, and then perform PAC based correlation 
between trace 1 and trace 2, and then between trace 3 and trace 4, respectively. We 
found 10 common attackers and 12 common victims between trace 1 and trace 2, and 58 
common attackers and 70 common victims between trace 3 and trace 4, respectively. 
The example in Fig. 14 shows that the common attacker (right hand side) was 
discovered from the two traces (left hand side), which have different packet counts for 
the identified IP. Here the term scale records the order of magnitude of a particular IP 
being correlated and the first two bytes of the IP addresses were replaced by symbols to 
protect network identities. 
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Fig. 14. An example of common attacker discovered by PAC. 
 
An attack chain often span across multiple networks. It requires cooperation of 
all involved networks to reconstruct the connection topology. The PAC client tool 
allows any two adjacent points on the chain to confirm their existence, i.e., the 
neighborhood relationship of two networks on an unknown attack chain. One option for 
the next level correlation is based on an attack chain length calculation technique. That 
is, two confirmed neighbors can exchange the length information (about the unknown 
attack chain) that they already received from other neighbors, and then produce their 
own latest lengths. When a network finds that the length of an attack chain exceeds a 
threshold, it can spread the information for follow up actions.  
Without loss of generality, we used the attack chain of Agobot infection to 
illustrate the key steps involved in the process. In the experiment, five virtual hosts (HA-
HE), each of runs an un-patched Windows 2000 with DCOM vulnerability, were placed 
in five different networks NA, NB, NC, ND, NE. Snort configured with DCOM-Port-
Scanning rules was also installed on these networks to monitor inbound traffic. A 
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simulated botmaster instructed the Agobot client on HA to infect four other hosts one by 
one. SnortB running on NB detects the intrusion from HA and HB is its victim. Similarly, 
SnortC, SnortD, and SnortE also generated their local alerts. Administrators of NB and NC 
have agreed to use their PACs to correlate their victim IP addresses vs. attack source IP 
addresses.  
When PACB and PACC respectively have the victim IP addresses (of NB) and 
attack source addresses (of NC) as their inputs, both PACB and PACC conclude that HB is 
matched. As a result, NB (NC) knows the existence of an attack chain HA → HB → NC 
(HB → HC), but NB does not know which host on NC has been attacked and NC does not 
know HB was also attacked by HA. After a length exchange, Both NC and NB know that 
the length of the attack chain is 3, i.e., HA → HB → NC (NA → HB → HC). Following a 
similar argument, PACC and PACD can conclude that they are respectively on an attack 
chain fragment of NA → HB →HC → ND and HC → HD after they complete their alert 
correlation. After length exchange, NC and ND know that they are on an attack chain of 
length 4. Neighboring networks can inform each other about an attack chain whenever 
the length discovered by the correlation process exceeds a threshold. 
Snapshots from the experiments are illustrated in Fig. 15. Each IP address with 
its discovered appearing times were fed to PAC for matching. For example, the entry 
B.B.2.111 (in red color) indicates the discovered IP address of HB, and below it 
d_B.B.2.111 indicates that it is a destination IP. After their matching, NB and NC can both 
see that they are the neighborhood of each other: NB gets A.A.2.110(HA) →B.B.2.111(HB) 
→NC (B.B.2.111 attacks an unknown IP in C’s network). On the other hand, NC gets 
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B.B.2.111(HB)→ C.C.2.112(HC). After they exchange their length information, both 
networks know that the existence of an attack chain of three. The correlation process can 
be indefinitely expanded between any two networks. The length information can also be 
generalized to include more information, e.g., branches, so that an arbitrary attack chain 
topology can be derived based on our scheme. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Illustration on discovery of the neighborhood on an infection chain. 
 
PAC can be used for cross-network correlation to derive more global signatures 
by exclusion of as much local information as possible in generation of their LCS. As 
discussed earlier, other shorter common substrings can also be iteratively generated 
using Protocol VI. To evaluate Protocol VI in PAC, we used local signatures generated 
by Autograph run on different networks as the inputs to generate their LCS. Four types 
of traffic were used in the example. The type I traffic is consisted of CodeRed I and 
CodeRed II worms. The other three types of traffic (type II, III and IV) are plain text, 
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HTTP, and some binary executable files of regular applications. The testbed setup for 
this experiment is illustrated in Fig. 16. In the first phase of the experiment, we let hosts 
E & F scan ports on host B in network 1 and host C in network 2, respectively. Two 
Autographs deployed at network 1 and network 2 detected the port scanning and then 
added E and F to their suspicious IP lists for network 1 and network 2, respectively. All 
subsequent packets sent from E and F to the scanned ports of B and C were classified as 
abnormal traffic. In phase 2, hosts E and F began to transmit mixed traffic of types I-IV 
to the two domains. CodeRed I (II) traffic was included in the traffic. Using signatures 
created by Autograph in the two different networks as inputs, we generated the LCS for 
CodeRed I and CodeRed II and removed the other types of traffic as unmatched (local) 
contents. 
 
 
Fig. 16. Attack patterns of CodeRed I & CodeRed II in the testbed. 
In a similar experiment, we first used Autograph to extract local signatures from 
local alert trace 1 and trace 2 separately. Most signatures came from attempts to exploit 
vulnerable services such as HTTP (port 80), Netbios-ssn (port 139), Microsoft-ds (port 
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445). Then, we used PAC to determine the common signature between these local 
signatures. Experimental results showed that Autograph totally found seven (four) local 
signatures from trace 1 (2). We were able to generate the common signature correlated 
from local ones for a malware instance that successfully exploited Microsoft-ds service 
in both traces. 
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